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ABSTRACT 
The Government of Sri Lanka declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, putting an end to a conflict of thirty years. The sudden demise of 
the LTTE, one of the most ruthless yet successful insurgent organizations, is worth 
understanding. This thesis attempts to do this by exploring the internal political 
dynamics, external influence on the conflict, and the Sri Lankan military’s adaptations in 
order to determine what contributed to the demise of the LTTE. This thesis will argue 
that one of the most critical aspects of success for the government and its military was 
learning from adversity and from the LTTE, and adapting the political and military 
organizations of Sri Lanka. By becoming fast-adapting organizations, both the 
government as a whole and the military, in particular, managed to conduct a successful 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Sri Lanka has 2,500 years of recorded history, the most recent 500 years of which 
consists of chronicles of the country’s successive colonization by the Portuguese, Dutch, 
and British from 1505 until 1948, at which time it gained its independence. The newly 
independent nation retained the name Ceylon until the 1972 constitution stated that the 
country would be renamed Sri Lanka.  
The ethnic make-up of the island nation is comprised of 72% Sinhalese, 18% 
Tamils (12% Sri Lankan Tamils and 6% Indian Tamils), 7% Muslims, 1% Malays and 
2% other.  Sri Lanka is predominantly a Buddhist country; the religious make-up of Sri 
Lanka consists of Buddhists at 70%, Hindus at 16%, Islamists at 7%, Christians at 6%, 
and other at 1%, respectively. 1 
Politically, Sri Lanka has 25 districts under 9 provinces (refer to Figure 1). The 
citizens living in the Northern and Eastern provinces are predominantly Tamil and the 
Sinhalese dominate the other seven provinces. Sri Lanka is located in close proximity to 
India. Its location in the Indian Ocean on the sea communication lines that connect the 
west to the east gives the island nation a strategic importance (refer to Figure 2).  
Since independence, Sri Lankan politics have been strongly democratic, but 
fractured along ethnic and class lines. The country has a multiparty system in which two 
major parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), 
have alternated rule-forming coalitions with the minor parties. A third major party, which 
came into the mainstream politics only recently, is the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 
(JVP). After attempting two armed insurrections in 1971 and 1983 to replace the 
governments in power with their own Marxist-based government, the JVP gave up arms. 
Ethnically aligned politics has been also a major part in Sri Lankan politics, where the 
                                                 
1 “Background Note: Sri Lanka,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of South and Central Asian 
Affairs, accessed on April 10, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm.  
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two major parties have always depended on minor ethnic Tamil and Muslim political 
leaders support to form coalition governments. 
Tensions between the Tamil minority and the Sinhala majority gave rise to an 
insurgent organization, at times considered the most ruthless terrorist organization in the 
world, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Backed by a widespread and 
wealthy international Tamil population, the LTTE was initially perceived by the world as 
the true representation of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. The LTTE conducted more 
suicide attacks than any other terrorist group in the world; they murdered a former Indian 
Premier in 1991 and a Sri Lankan president 1993; and they killed or maimed many other 
high-valued targets. At the group’s peak strength in 2005, the LTTE’s order of battle 
included land, naval, and air forces, and an elite unit of trained suicide bombers. The 
Tiger’s military success forced the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) into conceding 
territory to the LTTE’s control and, in 2002; the LTTE forced the GoSL into 
negotiations. 
In 2006, after the failures of a fourth peace negotiation attempt facilitated by 
Norway, the current GoSL under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, initiated a full-scale 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operation to fight the LTTE both militarily and politically. By 
May 2009, the LTTE had lost its leadership and had been defeated on the battlefield. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This study will explore the Sri Lankan situation through the eyes of political 
change, external influence, and military developments from Sri Lankan Independence in 
1948 to the demise of the LTTE in 2009. This study will attempt to explain the 
accelerated and unprecedented demise of the LTTE during its last years (2006–2009). 
The primary research question is: What contributed to the demise of the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Elam?  
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has been a major topic in world military and political 
thinking recently. The demise of the LTTE and the successes of the GoSL and Sri Lankan 
Armed Forces (SLAF) are notable in this context. As such a secondary question is: Are 
the variables that contributed to this LTTE demise unique or reproducible? 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In terms of empirical analysis of the Tamil populace, K. M. De Silva, a prominent 
Sinhalese research professor, has written many publications on this topic. His books 
layout an understanding and experience of the Tamil people and thereby the Tamil 
militancy’s claim for a separate state.2 He also portrays a Sinhalese perspective of the 
situation. De Silva believes that the Tamil peoples’ reluctance to accept their status as a 
minority led to the division in the country. He also addresses India’s involvement with 
the issue and the resulting implications from the Sri Lankan point of view.3  
While De Silva provides a Sinhalese perspective, there are a prominent number of 
Tamil intellectuals covering the alternative ethnic viewpoint. Publications by Chelvadurai 
Manogaran, a Malaysian-born Sri Lankan Tamil who is a prominent professor in Sri 
Lanka, explains the rise of the ethnic conflict and also forwards the notion that the only 
viable solution would be a federal state solution.4 His work also covers the historical, 
sociological, and political aspects of the problem from a Tamil viewpoint.5 
Similarly, Jayarathnam Wilson, a Jaffna-born Tamil with close ties to the first 
president of Sri Lanka during the initial stages of the LTTE and Tamil militancy, 
provides yet another account of the situation from a Tamil perspective. He argues that the 
unitary state of Sri Lanka or “Ceylon” was an invention of the British colonial rulers and 
that in the pre-colonial era the Tamil Kingdom of the North and the Sinhalese Kingdom 
of the South were in fact different and separate states. He also notes that the Sinhalese, by 
initiating movements to make Sinhalese the official language of the island and by 
                                                 
2 Professor K. M. De Silva is the author of many publications on Sri Lanka, including the following: 
The “Traditional Homelands” of the Tamils: Separatist Ideology in Sri Lanka: A Historical Appraisal, A 
History of Sri Lanka, and Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka.  
3 K. M. De Silva, Regional Powers and Small State Security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977–1990 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 1–388. 
4 Chelvadurai Manogaran, The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity  (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1994), 1–247. 
5 Ibid., 1–247. 
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discriminating Tamils in government employment, have shown their inability to accept 
Tamils as equals, and this, he argues, is a root cause for the conflict.6 
From a more international perspective, R. Narayan Swamy has followed and 
written about the Sri Lankan situation for many years. As an Indian journalist and 
intellectual, his perspective was important in terms of understanding the Indian 
assessment of the situation in Sri Lanka. While in his early books, Swamy focused on 
exposing the LTTE and its leaders as a terrorist organization,7 his most recent 
publications argued that the loss of Indian political support was a critical factor leading to 
the LTTE’s defeat.  
Brian Blodgett provided a more thorough military perspective.8 As a U.S. Army 
officer, he analyzed the changes in technology, doctrine, and the mission of the Sri Lanka 
Armed forces, while providing insight into the development, transformations, and 
adaptation of the military from a ceremonial force to its current status. He believed that 
the Sri Lankan military shifted from a ceremonial force equipped by outdated equipment 
and doctrine to a force that was semi-modernized to handle the internal threats it faced 
from the 1950s to 2004. Also, LTC Raj Vijaysiri, a Sri Lanka Army officer attending the 
U.S. Army General Command and Staff College, argued in his thesis that the Sri Lankan 
government’s failure to understand the internal and external political implications and to 
select the correct and necessary counterinsurgency strategies contributed to the initial 
failures the government faced in the war. 
More recently, U.S. Army Major Steven Battle wrote his master’s thesis on the 
demise of the LTTE while attending the Naval Postgraduate School in 2009. He 
highlighted the importance of legitimacy for an insurgency to gain victory. He contended 
                                                 
6 A. Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1988). 
7 R. Narayan Swamy has followed the Sri Lankan conflict for Indian and other international 
publications. His publications include: Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas and Inside an Elusive 
Mind: Prabhakaran. 
8 Brian Blodgett, Sri Lanka’s Military: The Search for a Mission, 1949–2004 (San Diego, CA: 
Aventine Press, 2004). 
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that the LTTE distanced itself from its local population support because of its actions 
and, by doing so, lost political legitimacy that was needed to sustain the insurgency.9 
While this thesis will not compete with any of the preceding arguments, it will 
explore the possibility of looking at this situation in Sri Lanka within the context of  the 
general COIN principals and theories that are present in today’s global arena. From a 
theoretical perspective, this thesis will draw implications from the COIN literature. In 
particular, this thesis will focus on how insurgencies are defeated in order to understand 
what the Sri Lankan experience can tell us about COIN. 
1. Political Willpower and Stability 
Generally speaking, understanding how insurgencies come to an end became 
more important after the end of the Cold War. This can be attributed to the de-emphasis 
on conflicts between nation states and the rapid rise of non-state actors or “insurgents” 
against nation states. Recently, low intensity conflicts between states and non-state actors 
have become more relevant than state versus state conflicts. For this reason, the wealth of 
literature and knowledge on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies (COIN) is vast and 
varied.  But, as mentioned in RAND’s10 publication, the “contemporary discourse on the 
subject is voluminous and often contentious.”11 The same research noted that there was 
no single COIN approach that alone guaranteed success. The RAND research team, led 
by Christopher Paul, stated, “this means rejecting out of hand any proposal or plan that 
emphasizes a single COIN approach or other ‘magic bullet’ at the expense of other 
positive practices.”12 Therefore, successful COIN synchronized multiple practices that 
were customized for that specific campaign.13  
                                                 
9 Stephen L. Battle, “Lessons in legitimacy the LTTE end game of 2007–2009” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2010). 
10 RAND Corporation (Research and Development) used to be the think tank of the United States 
Military, and is now a nonprofit organization. 
11 Christopher Paul, Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2010). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ben Connable, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010). 
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Gordon McCormick suggested that the most important action in a COIN 
environment is the control of the population. He argued that whoever gained the majority 
control of the population would win the power struggle.14  Ben Connable’s RAND 
research team contradicted this notation arguing that tangible political support was often 
more important than popular support in COIN.15 Any insurgency needs a source to 
“replenish and obtain personnel, materiel, financing, intelligence, and sanctuary.”16 This 
was identified by Connable as “tangible support,”17 the securing of which was a key 
aspect of the success or failure of an insurgency and the ability of the COIN force to 
disrupt this flow of tangible support to the guerrilla force directly correlated to success in 
COIN.18 
Andrew Mack argued that relative and asymmetric interests explained how states 
could lose to inferior, irregular foes. In other words, the extent of resolve or political will 
of a group could alter the physical symmetry of irregular warfare. While his analysis was 
based on industrial nations acting on expeditionary wars (the French in Algeria and the 
USA in Vietnam), this theory still provides a framework within which the Sri Lankan 
conflict can be viewed, specifically when the GoSL had to diverge its interest on to the 
Marxist (JVP)19 uprising in the south while attacking the LTTE in the north.  
2. Controlling External Influence 
While the above publications were used to understand the internal political 
aspects that contributed to the conflict in Sri Lanka and its conclusion, the following 
research can be used to explain the cause and effect of the external political aspects of the 
research. Findings by Connable’s RAND research shed light on elements of external 
                                                 
14 Gordon H. McCormick. “Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare” (series of lectures, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, Winter Quarter, 2011). 
15 Paul, Victory has a Thousand Fathers. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Janatha Vimikthi Peramuna (JVP) is currently a mainstream political party in Sri Lanka who, 
during the 1980s, staged an armed insurgency to overthrow the government with the aim of installing a 
socialist government in power. 
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support and their effect on the government-conducted COIN efforts. One of the findings 
suggested that “governments benefit from direct support but tend to lose more frequently 
when provided indirect support; they do slightly better with no external support at all. 
Once support is given, it almost always creates a dependency on the external sponsor.”20 
Both Connable’s and Mao Tse-Tung’s publications underscored the importance of 
sanctuary.  The voluntary provision of sanctuary, internal or external, directly correlated 
with an improved likelihood of insurgent victory.  Indeed, insurgencies rarely survived or 
succeeded without it. Controlling external influence, both internationally and 
domestically, was a critical aspect of effective COIN.  
3. Adoptive Military Strategy 
The most important aspect for Sri Lanka’s successful COIN campaign was the 
military. While both political stability and control over the external influence were 
critical, their true purpose was to provide a positive environment within which the 
military strategy succeeded in eliminating the LTTE.  
Therefore, an ideal COIN effort began and ended in success. However, a poor 
start does not guarantee a poor end. According to Connable’s RAND study, the 
adaptability of the COIN force was the key to the success of the operation.21 The same 
study further suggested that effective COIN practices are mutually reinforcing. Put 
simply, “the balance of good versus bad practices perfectly predicts outcomes.”22  
Christopher Paul’s RAND publication suggested pursuing, building, and 
maintaining forces able to engage in multiple mutually supporting lines of operation 
simultaneously. Additionally, Paul recommended ensuring the positive involvement of 
the host-nation’s government, effectively adapting, and avoiding (and discouraging allies  
 
                                                 
20 Ben Connable, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010). 
21 Ibid.  
22 Paul, Victory has a Thousand Fathers. 
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and partners from) using repression and collective punishment in COIN.23 Furthermore, 
for those using adaptive military strategies, scholars believed that a government’s 
chances of winning increased slightly over the decade long lifespan of the modern 
insurgency.24 Also, “insurgency is an endeavor best practiced in rural, or a mix of rural 
and urban, terrain.”25 Hence, a state’s ability to dominate these spaces ensured its 
success. 
One of the most important arguments for analyzing the military successes and 
failures of both the GoSL and LTTE came from Ivan Arreguin-Toft. He introduced the 
concept of strategic interaction that dictated that the symmetry between a powerful and 
weaker entity gave the powerful entity the upper hand. 26 If the strategic interaction was 
asymmetric, then the weaker entity stood a chance of victory.  
Another important argument was presented by LTC John Nagl of the U.S. Army 
in his book Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam27 Nagl, traces the organizational learning and non-learning of the British 
Army in Malaya and the U.S. Army in Vietnam. His intent is to make the “primary 
argument …that better performance of the British army in learning and implementing a 
successful counterinsurgency doctrine in Malaya (as compared to the American army’s 
failure to learn and implement successful counterinsurgency doctrine in Vietnam) is best 
explained by the differing organizational cultures of the two armies.”  Nagl argues that it 
is an army’s ability to learn, understand, and adapt to the changes in an operational 
environment that determines the success or failure of that army.28 
Also, based on his study of organizational culture and learning institutions, Nagl 
notes that “the ability of military organizations to adopt to change – whether that change 
occurs in military technology, in the structures of the international system, or in the 




26 Arreguin Toft, Ivan. How the Weak Win Wars, International Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128. 
27 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xxii. 
28 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, xxii. 
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nature of war itself – is an important component of a state’s ability to guarantee its own 
security…” 29 Nagl argues that an organization’s (in this case, the military’s) ability to 
adapt is “ the critical variable is not the nature of national government, which in most 
cases has little impact on which policies the military choses to adopt. It is the 
organizational culture of the military institution that determines whether innovation 
succeeds or fails.” 30 He further states that “the key variable explaining when militaries 
will adopt to change in warfare is the creation of a consensus among the leaders of the 
organization that such innovation is in the long-term interests of the organization itself.” 
31 And that, “among changes required are drastic modifications of military organizations 
to make their leadership more responsive to changes in their environment.”32  
These observations and arguments on learning and adapting put forward by John 
Nagl will be helpful when putting the adaptation and transformation of the Sri Lankan 
situation in to perspective. 
4. The Missing Element 
It should be noted that the historical literature on COIN in Sri Lanka is very 
comprehensive. However, what is missing is an organized analysis of the Sri Lankan 
COIN efforts using these already established theories to understand the LTTE’s demise 
and how the special operations conducted by the GoSL military brought it about. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
In answering the primary question of this thesis, this study will examine the role 
of political will, stability, and legitimacy, the effects of external influence, and the use of 
adaptive military strategy. This thesis will review the political, economic, social, and 
military changes in Sri Lanka in relation to this conflict from pre-LTTE Tamil militancy 
in 1948 to the final war effort of the 2006–2009 period. This research will employ a 
                                                 
29 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 214. 
30 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 215. 
31 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 216. 
32 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 218. 
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historical case study methodology. In order to address the core question, it is necessary to 
understand, and have a general theoretical means to narrow down and guide the research. 
To this end, this study will attempt to generate this lens using the already established 
studies on COIN and insurgency. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II examines the chronological sequence of events with regard to the 
internal political dynamics of the country. Chapter III examines the chronological 
sequence of events with regard to external influences and changes with respect to the 
conflict. Chapter IV examines the adaptations and transformations that the military 
underwent. Chapter V presents my analysis of the changes and their effect on demise of 






















II. INTERNAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS 
This chapter intends to explore the changes in the internal political dynamic of Sri 
Lanka, which at times hindered and at times supported the LTTE’s cause and which 
eventually allowed for a political environment that was favorable to the government’s 
COIN efforts. This section discusses domestic politics, and leaves out the external, 
global, and regional political changes which will be discussed in a later chapter. With this 
in mind, it is necessary to realize that these two very interconnected topics have been 
separated for the goal of simplification and so that the situation can be better understood. 
The reality is that the internal politics of any country is influenced by the global and 
regional political situation. Additionally, tracing and presenting every political event 
spanning almost seven decades is impossible for a study of this nature. As such, this 
chapter only examines the primary events in order to understand changes in the internal 
political situation that paved the way for the defeat of the LTTE and the military success 
of the GoSL’s COIN initiatives. 
Unlike the countries surrounding the island, the struggle for independence in Sri 
Lanka can be seen as more subdued and diplomatic than a typical revolution. In fact, 
many have argued that in 1948 Sri Lanka received only a limited independence. 
Countries surrounding the island, such as neighboring India, saw much more blood, and 
aggression, while Sri Lanka’s nationalist leaders engaged more in dialogue and politics to 
gain what can be described as partial independence at the time. And while, in 1948 
Ceylon did become a dominion of the British Commonwealth, it took several decades 
more for it to become an independent republic of its own.33 
Different ethnic identities in Sri Lanka are “hierarchically nested segments” 
which run parallel to each other.34 Although there are a number of ethnic groups in Sri 
Lanka (i.e., the Sinhalese, the Sri Lankan Tamils, the Sri Lankan Muslims, the Tamils of 
                                                 
33 Kingsley De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 601 – 
605. 
34 Charles F. Keyes, “Towards a new formulation of the concept of ethnic group,” Ethnicity 03, 
(1976): 202–213. 
 14
Indian Origin, the Burghers, the Veddhas (believed to be the aboriginal people of Sri 
Lanka), the Malays, and many more others), the most significant socio-ethnic division in 
Sri Lankan society is between the numerical majority, the Sinhalese, and the numerical 
minority, the Sri Lankan Tamils.35 Over the years, tensions between these two groups 
escalated into a conflict of opinion about the Sri Lankan state. It was this conflict of 
opinion that escalated into violence from the 1970s onwards. Sri Lankan historian K. M. 
De Silva aptly captured this conflict of opinion when he described Sri Lanka’s political 
reality as: 
The Sinhalese, the majority group in the island, and the Sri Lankan 
Tamils, the islands most significant minority, have sharply different 
perceptions on the nature of the Sri Lankan State; and diametrically 
opposed attitudes to decentralization and devolution of power to regional 
units of administration.36 
In addition to the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils, the other two major minority groups, 
the Tamils of Indian origin and the Sri Lankan Muslims, have their own perceptions 
about and grievances in relation to the Sri Lankan State. Historically, the Tamils of 
Indian Origin have had grievances over a denial of citizenship, and the Sri Lankan State’s 
ability to uplift them from a vulnerable socioeconomic status. The Sri Lankan Muslims, 
on the other hand, wish to have safeguards over their rights in geographical “pocket” 
areas in which they are a majority surrounded by high percentages of national and 
regional Sinhala or Tamil populations.  
If the Sri Lankan state was structured in a manner that addressed these grievances 
and accommodated differences of opinion in its policy-making mechanisms, a thirty-year 
civil war might have been avoided. Instead, the Sri Lankan state was inadequately 
structured to deal with social, economic, and political inequalities in an equitable manner, 
thus resulting in ethnic tension between the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils, while 
dragging the Tamils of Indian Origin, the Sri Lankan Muslims, and other ethnicities into 
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a “conflict of nationality.” By not addressing these inequalities over a long period of 
time, the result was the ethno-political groups entrenched themselves in different 
opinions over what the nature of the Sri Lankan state. These groups also held 
diametrically opposed attitudes towards decentralization and devolution. 
The modern beginnings of these tensions go back to the origin of Sri Lanka’s 
democratization process, when Sri Lanka became the first British crown colony to enjoy 
universal suffrage in 1931.37 Since being given independence in 1948, there have been 
key periods that have marked major changes in relations between Sri Lanka’s ethnic 
groups. While this had been a major political issue since the 1920s, even for its British 
Colonial rulers, the problem seemed headed for an “amicable settlement.”38 G.G. 
Ponnambalam, who led the Tamil cause since his election to the State Council in 1934, 
became a member of the Cabinet in the post-independent government. Doing so, he 
managed to absorb a significant portion of the leadership of the Tamil Congress into the 
government. By forming the United National Party (UNP), D.S. Senanayake, the first 
Prime Minster of Sri Lanka, managed to consolidate mutually exclusive nationalist 
movements into a single unit of cohesion. While the UNP from its inception had the 
approval of the influential Christian minority, it had no such ties with the Sinhala 
Buddhist majority. This deficiency was lessened by S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake’s decision 
to absorb his Sinhala Maha Sabha (translation: Great Sinhala Assembly) into the UNP. 
Also the Muslim community, which had earlier not distinguished itself as a separate unit 
and had backed the Tamils, now established themselves as a separate minority and sought 
association with the party.39 
In 1948, the Tamil Congress crossed over to the government and UNP. With this 
addition D.S. Senanayake found the consolidation he was looking for. But this 
consolidation of many elements of nationalism under one flag, the flag of “Sri Lankan 
Nationalism,” was fragile; the reasons being the conflicts in the varied interests of all the 
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parties involved, and the fact that the frictions between the majority and the main 
minority could not coheres. The main challenge to this fragile alliance achieved by D.S. 
Senanayake and the UNP was when S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake and his supporters in the 
parliament crossed over to the opposition in 1951.40 
In September 1951, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) was initiated under 
S.W.R.D Bandaranayake’s leadership. This “centrist political force …deliberately sought 
to become the focal point of all interest groups who were dissatisfied with the UNP, and 
at the same time was opposed to the Marxist solution to the country’s problems.”41 This 
group became the alternative to both the centralist UNP and the Marxist left. It also 
became the focal point for the Sinhala Buddhist activists, as both UNP and the left 
seemed unsympathetic toward their religious, linguistic, and cultural aspirations. The 
majority Sinhala Buddhist population, long dormant and under the belief that both 
colonial rulers and the post-independent government had unjustly sidelined them, were 
now building a stronghold of power within the democratic electoral system where their 
numbers gave them the upper-hand over all other groups. And while S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranayake and the SLFP were leading this movement, with the entrance of the 
Sinhala Buddhist’s into the political arena, the vision of Sri Lankan nationalism and a 
secular state with multiracial politics was dying.42 
The issues of the Sinhalese educated elite helped motivate the emergence of 
Sinhalese nationalism, which both of the main political parties realized, but the 
Bandaranayake-led SLFP managed to capitalize on this understanding since the UNP was 
late to address it: “The Sinhala educated intelligentsia found that the rewarding careers 
were closed to them by the pervasive dominance of English as the language of 
administration.”43 The Sinhala majority also felt that “the Tamil community had taken an 
unfair share of power by virtue of its superior educational opportunities.”44 The same 
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population demographic was predominantly Buddhist in religion and believed that “in its 
spiritual home Theravada Buddhism and culture associated with it were not receiving 
sufficient support or respect.”45This transformation of nationalist feeling from one that 
encompassed all of Sri Lanka’s ethnic and religious groups to Sinhala–Buddhist 
Nationalism affected all ethnic and religious groups in Ceylon, but mostly the Sinhalese 
and Tamils sects. In his article, “Power Sharing as Peace Structure: The Case of Sri 
Lanka,” conflict theorist Johan Galtung explains that in the process of state formation, 
“the problem is, to whom does the state belong?”46 This question is easily answered for 
the “mono-national state but problematic for the multinational state”47 such as Sri Lanka. 
During the 1950s period of independence, state government was eager, if not 
hasty, in the structuring of the State. The problem, as it would appear, was two-fold. On 
one hand, the main minority, the Sri Lankan Tamils, felt left out of all major decision-
making processes during and after the British rule, on the other hand, so did the majority 
Sinhalese. The English language requirement had limited the political and social domains 
to a group of few elite English-educated and English-speaking groups. As Galtung 
explains, because of the sheer complexity of State formation, usually a nationalistic view 
is taken: “State formation was in most cases a brutal process as the dominant nation took 
possession of a state as its home.”48 The UNDP Human Development Report from 2004 
offers a survey of methods still being used in state formation. These include: 
 Adoption of official-language laws, 
 Construction of nationalized systems of compulsory education, and 
 Diffusion of the dominant group's language and culture.49 
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These methodologies were evidenced in Sri Lanka by Bandaranayake’s pro-Sinhalese–
Buddhist ideology, which gathered the majority’s support and where the pro-multiracial, 
pro-multilingual conceptualization of the UNP was found wanting. Eager to not lose its 
stronghold, the UNP later switched over toward a narrower Sinhala-only attitude. 
However the politically motivated switch did not gain the approval of the country’s 
majority, resulting in the new S.W.R.D  Bandaranayake-led coalition of SLFP and other 
parties, such as the “Lanka Sama Samaja Pakshaya” (Lanka Socialist Party or LSSP) and 
the “Mahajana Ekshath Peramuna” (MEP or the People’s United Front) coming into 
power in 1956. The common motivation within this coalition was the commitment to 
Sinhala as the official language and the populist program of social and economic change. 
The UNP, with its late revision to Sinhala as the official language, had lost its Tamil 
Congress support in the North of the country, in turn making the Tamil Federal Party (the 
breakaway fraction of G.G. Ponambalam’s Tamil Congress) the dominant force in the 
North. For the Sinhalese majority, this transformation, or interchangeability of the 
concept of Sri Lankan Nationalism, with Sinhala–Buddhist Nationalism was justified for 
two major reasons: 
 In Sinhala the words for nation, race, and people are practically 
synonymous. Therefore the concept of a multi-communal nation-state 
reflected an incomprehensible notion. The unique, unparalleled historic 
context of the country and its strong identification as the land where 
Buddhism flourished in its purest form had become important to its people 
culturally, ideologically, and emotionally. 
 The State-formation and politics allowed for the long ignored majority to 
justify the laying aside of the multiracial model of democracy and instead 
paved the way for a closed, exclusive Sinhala model.50 
 
As the Sinhalese nationalist movement grew, so did the Tamil’s, mainly the 
Federal Party who “refused to endorse the assumption that Sinhalese Nationalism was 
interchangeable with the larger Sri Lankan Nationalism.”51 
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Prior to this period, Leftist parties, led by N.M Perera had since 1936 voiced 
support for the replacement of English, with both Sinhala and Tamil as the official 
languages of the country. But in 1944, it was J.R Jayawardana of the UNP (who later 
became the first Executive President of Sri Lanka) who had filed a motion to replace 
English as the official language of the country. In 1956, the Bandaranayake government 
brought forward the Official Language Act, introducing it to the House of 
Representatives. As the Sinhala - Buddhist majority of the country was the singular 
driving force behind S.W.R.D Bandaranayake’s political success, the Official Language 
Act could not escape the pressures of that majority. Consequently the Official Language 
act was amended to replace English with Sinhala alone, rather than both Sinhala, and 
Tamil as the leftist parties had first suggested.  The bill was passed with the support of 
the SLFP, and the UNP. The leftist LSSP, and Communist Party as well as the Tamil 
nationalist parties (Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi [ITAK—Federal Party] and the All 
Ceylon Tamil Congress) opposed it.52 
Popular opposition to the bill resulted in riots. The situation forced the 
government to postpone the full implementation of the legislation until January 1961. As 
means of resolving the growing tensions, Bandaranayke secured parliamentary approval 
of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act, which granted “reasonable” use of the 
Tamil Language in administration. During this time, the Tamil Federal Party (ITAK) 
demanded the right to self-administration of the Northern and Eastern provinces under a 
federalist constitution, for the satisfactory solution to the problem of settlement of Indian 
Tamil plantation workers within the island.53 
The request by the Tamil Federal Party triggered what can only be described as a 
“Sinhalese minority complex.” While it is true that the Sinhalese enjoyed a majority of 
over 70%54 within the island, Tamils had always been seen as a majority in this specific 
border region (the Indian subcontinent), with Sinhalese being outnumbered almost four to 
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one. The claim for Federalist control of the North and East by the Tamil political parties 
increased the concern of the Sinhalese that a Tamil majority would gain power within the 
island. Sri Lanka’s Northern region’s close proximity to Tamil Nadu, India coupled with 
the Federal Party’s outline of plans caused panic among the Sinhalese.55 
With this state of affairs as the backdrop, Banadaranayake and S.V. 
Chelvanayagam, then leader of the Tamil Federal Party (considered to be the father of the 
Tamil Eelam [homeland] concept), held negotiations regarding the issue. The result was 
the Banadaranayake-Chelvanayagam pact. The main compromises agreed upon included,  
 The Tamil Language becoming an official language for administration in 
the North and East. 
 As a concession to the federal demand, a scheme of devolving 
administrative powers to regional councils. 
 Restrictions on the settlement of Sinhalese in Northern and Eastern 
province irrigation schemes (the new irrigation schemes re-routed the 
largest river and, with it, forced the farmers to relocate around the new 
route).56 
While parties such as the UNP, who strived to recover from their loss of support 
from the Sinhala—Buddhist majority, vehemently opposed the pact, resistance also came 
from within Bandaranayke’s own party (the Sinhalese extremist). Therefore, the pact had 
to be revoked by the administration due to opposition within the country. This also gave 
birth to the claim that the only solution was for there to be a separate state and that, inside 
Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese majority would not allow for the Tamil minority to hold the 
same status/standing as the Sinhalese. It was a claim that was voiced by many prominent 
Tamil advocates at the time and would later come to be the slogan of the LTTE terrorist 
organization. This claim would come to be known as the claim to Tamil Eelam [Tamil 
Homeland].57 
While the country remained in this fragile and insecure state, S.W.R.D 
Bandaranayake was assassinated by a Buddhist monk who shot the Prime Minister on 25 
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September 1959 at his private residence. After Bandaranaike's death, Wijeyananda 
Dahanayake, Minister of Education and the Leader of the House, took over as acting 
Prime Minister after being appointed by the Ceylonese parliament. However, uneasy 
politics (where much of the leadership of the party was not in line with his own policies 
and thinking) caused him to fall out of favor with the members of the government. The 
consequence was the removal of all ministers of Bandaranaike's cabinet in less than a 
year. Leadership of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party eventually fell into the hands of 
Bandaranaike's widow, Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranaike, who was appointed as a 
Member of Parliament. She became the world's first female Prime Minister when the 
Samagi Peramuna [United Front] coalition, led by the SLFP, won elections in July 
1960.58 
In 1970, when Sirimavo Bandaranaike came back into power,59 the Federal Party 
(ITAK) submitted a new set of proposals to the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs for a 
federal form of government. The following points characterized the submission: 
 An autonomous Tamil state,  
 An autonomous Muslim state, and 
 Three autonomous Sinhalese states and a Tamil Language Regulation Act. 
All of these proposals were rejected, leading to further frustration among the Sri 
Lankan Tamil ethno-polity.60 Strikingly, however, it was not the Sri Lankan Tamils who 
first took up arms against the government in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese uprising by the 
“Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna” (JVP or People’s Liberation Front) happened in 1971. 
JVP, referred to as Che’s Boys (in reference to Ernesto "Che" Guevara), followed a 
Marxism-Leninism ideology. The two main characteristics of this insurrection were that 
it was fundamentally a youth-led movement and that it consisted of individuals from 
highly vulnerable segments of the population who felt that they had been isolated from 
State power and the socioeconomic development process of the Sri Lankan State. 
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Moreover its members felt that the Nation’s Leftist coalitions would never provide for its 
own aspirations and development.  The insurrection aimed to seize power from the 
government by taking up arms. The Sri Lankan State ruthlessly crushed them. In 1972, 
the United Front government introduced the new constitution of Sri Lanka, which in 
effect moved Sri Lanka away from the Dominion status of the British Commonwealth 
toward the “Socialist Democratic Republic of Sri Lanka.”61 
With the establishment of this new constitution, the Sri Lankan government 
further complicated relations with minorities in the following respects: 
 Chapter II of the constitution stated “the Republic of Sri Lanka shall give 
to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly, it shall be the duty of the 
State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all 
religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e),” and 
 The Constitution reaffirmed a previous bill which made Sinhala the 
language of the State.62 
The majority Sinhalese supported this constitution, and even the UNP supported its 
cause. Additionally, the Roman Catholics and Christian minorities succumbed to its 
ruling, not attempting to oppose the status given to Buddhism.63 The reasoning behind 
this inaction was based on a loosely acknowledged acceptance that prevailing politics 
adhered to the dominant majority alone. But for the main minority, the Tamils, these 
moves reconfirmed their status as what they called “second-class citizens.”64 The 
political leadership of the Tamil community, made up mostly from the Jaffna Tamil elite, 
had enjoyed considerable acceptance and status from the British under the colonial 
Ceylon where the British Empire employed a divide-and-rule policy. The new 
constitution, and subsequent opposition to it, provided the rationale to effectively unite all 
major Tamil political parties, including the vital two groups: the Federal Party and the 
Tamil Congress. This unification resulted in the forming of the Tamil United Liberation 
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Front (TULF). This was also the first time that the Indian plantation workers joined the 
political mainstream of the indigenous Tamils.  
The increased alienation of the Tamil people, as a result of the constitution, 
eventually intensified and converted a larger portion of the Northern Tamils toward the 
idea of a separate state. The TULF, with its dominant partner, the Federal Party, 
supported a separate state for the Tamil-speaking areas in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces.65 
From 1973 onwards the island saw the emergence of embryonic Sri Lankan Tamil 
youth militant groups. As these groups became more established and organized, they 
instituted connections in the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora communities in the UK and 
Canada.66 Some of the Sri Lankan Tamil youth organizations emerging during this period 
were the: 
 Tamil New Tigers (TNT), later known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE)  
 Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) 
 People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) 
 Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)  
 Eelam Revolutionary organization of Students (EROS) 67 
 
As De Silva notes, “The most militant agitators for separatism were the educated 
unemployed youth.”68 One example of the Tamil youths’ opposition occurred when the 
United Front introduced changes to the university admission system, which the Tamil 
youth saw as a deliberate and discriminative move against them. 
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While these detrimental changes were taking root, the government itself was 
experiencing severe friction within the coalition. The support for the dominant SLFP was 
eroding and the other members of the coalition, having lost confidence in the coalition, 
were removing themselves from it. By the start of 1977, the coalition (aka the United 
Front) was no more. What remained was a single SLFP party that was about to face the 
general elections. On 21 July 1977, during the general elections, the UNP led by the then 
opposition leader J.R. Jayewardene, managed to “displace the SLFP in a landslide 
victory.”69 This election saw a political party in Sri Lanka gaining a “clear majority of 
the popular vote”70 where the UNP won “140 out of 168 [parliament] seats.”71 Because 
of the country’s peculiar electoral system and because of the concentration of Tamils in 
the North and East electoral, the Tamil coalition (TULF) won 18 seats and “a Tamil 
became the opposition leader”72 for the first time since Sri Lanka’s independence. The 
exceptional situation caused an uneasy tension in the minds of some Sinhalese and 
Tamils. In mid-August, amid these tensions, a minor incident in Jaffna which involved a 
“clash between police and a section of the people”73 instigated a ferocious outbreak of 
communal violence between the Sinhalese and Tamils “… on a scale comparable with 
the riots of the mid-1950s.”74 At the outset of the election and in its initial stages the 
Tamils had supported Jayewardene’s government (the UNP), because of its promise of 
“improved ethnic relations.”75 Time would show that these hopes would soon be 
disappointed. The new government adopted yet another new constitution in 1978, in 
which an executive presidency was introduced. The new constitution included: 
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 A direct election of an Executive President, 
 The upgraded status of the Tamil language: “Article 19 declared that 
Sinhala and Tamil shall be the national languages of Sri Lanka (with 
Sinhala remaining the sole official language),”76 
 Proportional representation for the parliament, which was seen as a more 
suitable system for equal representation, 
 A new system of local governments in the form of district councils, 
 The removal of the citizenship issue: “Article 26 abolished the distinction 
between citizens by descent and citizens by registration – an irritant to the 
Indian Tamils - and this removed the stigma of second-class citizenship”77 
The liberal, open economic policy of the government was also seen as an 
opportunity for the Tamils to achieve economic improvement.78 The government’s 
educational policy also provided the Tamils with easier access to the university system.  
Yet, while these developments would have, in theory, improved the relations with the 
GoSL and the Tamil population, this was not the case. The government’s ability to 
implement the directives of the new constitution with regard to minority rights was met 
with large opposition by the extremist elements of the Sinhalese community. 
The Executive Presidency introduced by the constitution concentrated a large 
amount of state power in the hands of the executive arm of the government, including the 
ability to enact a power devolution process. President Jayewardene then appointed a 
presidential commission to inquire and report on the creation of the District Development 
Councils, which was to be a scheme of power-sharing applicable to all of the twenty-four 
districts in Sri Lanka. It was very clear that this scheme of devolution would be done 
irrespective of ethnic composition, and it was not intended to provide a different political 
or administrative structure based on ethnicity for any particular part of the country.79 This 
was however rejected by the Tamil polity who, along with the recognition of their 
cultural and ethnic identity, wanted more power within a provincial framework. The end 
of the 1970s marked the rise of Tamil separatist militancy and the continued 
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concentration of State power into the hands of the Sinhalese. With these two opposing 
trends continually growing stronger something was bound to give way and, in 1983, it 
did.80 
The militant Tamil youth movement, which was becoming more radicalized, had 
begun hijacking the moderate voice of the political movements. The LTTE stood out 
distinctively during this period because of the ideology and dedication of its founder, 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, and the support it received from the leadership of the TULF and 
the Tamil Federal Party. In 1975, the LTTE rose to prominence with its assassination of 
Alfred Duraiappa, the mayor of Jaffna.81 Duraiappa was a moderate Tamil and a member 
of the SLFP party, who was democratically elected as the mayor of Jaffna, the main 
Tamil city on the island and the capital of the Northern Province. From its inception, the 
LTTE was fixed on the single goal of a separate state for the Tamil people, “Tamil 
Eelam,” and they would not let even one of their own get in the way. According to the Sri 
Lankan Defense Ministry, “this separate state was to comprise 28.7% of Sri Lanka’s 
landmass and 60% of its coastline.”82 And, in 1983, the LTTE took action towards this 
separate state when Sri Lanka saw the most devastating and bloody communal violence 
of its history.83 This event is generally believed to be the start of full-scale civil war 
between the LTTE, and the Sri Lankan government forces. 
The event that set the stage for this act of unprecedented violence took place on 
23 July 1983.  The LTTE, which was swiftly becoming the most predominant Tamil 
militant movement in the North and East, ambushed and killed over thirteen Sri Lankan 
Army soldiers in Jaffna.84 This attack precipitated violent and devastating riots in the 
southern parts of the Island. A mass funeral held for the slain soldiers at the country’s 
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capital, Colombo, managed to gather a massive crowd from different parts of the country.  
Soon after the funeral, those present turned violent and ravaged the streets of Colombo 
and the suburbs in an aggressive and brutal search for the Tamil populations living there. 
The event would come to be known as “Black July.” The LTTE’s actions had a domino 
effect, which caused violence to run amuck through the country for more than thirty 
years. Massive numbers of Tamils living among the Sinhalese in the South began 
migrating to the North and East, which agitated the Tamils already living in those areas, 
causing them to, in turn, act violently against the Sinhalese living there. The incidents of 
“Black July” did more to polarize and instill hatred between the two ethnic groups than 
any other previous event. Moreover, it was pivotal for the LTTE to legitimize its 
unrestrained use of violence in the following decades.85 
The same incident catalyzed an exodus of Tamil refugees who fled the country. 
Seeking asylum in countries such as Canada, the United States, and parts of the European 
Union, these populations went on to make up the international diaspora that supported the 
LTTE financially throughout the conflict, regardless of how brutal LTTE tactics became. 
The reason behind the situation was clear. These groups had left the country at the height 
of the Black July violence. No matter how much the dynamics changed within the 
country, whether or not the LTTE addressed the concerns of the Tamil communities on 
the ground or not, the resentment and injustice felt by these groups was harnessed. To 
them it seemed that what the LTTE was doing was a form of retribution. And the so the 
foreign funding continued to flow. This marked a significant change in the Tamil political 
trend of thought and diplomacy. For many Tamils there was no longer hope for a political 
solution to military action against the GoSL. This and the escalation of military action led 
to the involvement of India and the Thimpu negotiations (held in Thimpu, Capital of 
Bhutan) and the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka agreement of 1987 which effectively 
resulted in the LTTE replacing the collective Tamil political leadership as the “sole 
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representative” of the Tamils, and so, became the representative in    Sinhala–Tamil 
relations with regard to the north and east and the Tamil Eelam.86 
In 1985, there was a mutual declaration of peace and the Thimpu talks in Bhutan 
became the first recorded attempt at peace talks between the Sri Lankan government, the 
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the LTTE, and other rebel groups.  During these 
talks, it emerged that the Sri Lankan government was only offering the district to be the 
unit of devolution and not the province as required by the TULF and the various Tamil 
militant groups.  As a result, the rebel groups rejected the Sri Lankan government’s 
proposals and the peace talks failed, plunging Sri Lanka back into violence.87 
In 1989, at the end of his second term, President J.R Jayawardene handed over the 
country to his then Prime Minister, Ranasinghe Premadasa. Premadasa had won the 
presidential elections of 1988 after defeating Sirimavo Bandaranayake of the SLFP. And 
by 1980, the Tamil fight was being fronted by more radical youth movements. The Indian 
government supported some of these movements, while the others, though not endorsed 
by the Indian government, had managed to amass the support of the people of Tamil 
Nadu. While most of these movements splintered to create more militant groups, the 
number of groups and their separate effect is not of great importance when considering 
the response of the GoSL to these early militant groups of Tamil youth.88 
The events of 1983 marked a turning point in the dynamics of Sri Lanka’s 
discourse on ethno-political conflict. Militant separatist groups gradually edged out 
traditional Tamil parties and, from these groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
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virtually all their rivals among the other Tamil groups and sent what was referred to as its 
mentor, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), to the periphery of Tamil and Sri 
Lankan politics.90 
One of the most significant events of this period, however, was the intervention of 
the Indian government in the ethnic conflict. In 1987, due to the deterioration of the 
ethnic conflict and a rise in human rights abuses, an accord was signed between the 
GOSL, the Tamil groups, and the Indian government that led the way to the creation of 
the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution. This allowed for the creation of 
Provincial Councils throughout Sri Lanka into which power would be devolved. 
Additionally, the North and East provinces were merged into one administrative entity in 
order to create the North Eastern Provincial Council. During this time of change, an 
Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in the North and East to protect the 
peace. Paradoxically, a war broke out between the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) because the LTTE feared that the IPKF 
was encroaching upon their territory and encouraging the development of other Tamil 
militant groups. 
In this political atmosphere, in 1987, the Marxist Singhalese JVP (Janatha 
Vimukhthi Peramuna) led by Rohana Wijeweera began a campaign against the Indo-Sri 
Lankan agreement and started what is now known as the second JVP insurrection. This 
Sinhalese insurrection was distinguished from its predecessor by its strong Sinhala 
nationalist ideological characteristic. 
Ultimately, with the election of Ranasinghe Premadasa (UNP) as President in 
1988, the IPKF was withdrawn from Sri Lanka in 199091 and, in late 1989, the JVP 
rebellion was crushed and its leader, Wijeweera, was executed. While there was a 
temporary lull in fighting during 1990, what the LTTE called the ‘Second Eelam War’ 
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began again later that year92 and in 1991, the LTTE assassinated former Indian Premier 
Rajiv Gandhi in southern India. They also went on to assassinate Sri Lankan President 
Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993.93 
However, in August 1991, the Parliament of Sri Lanka constituted a cross-party 
select committee to come up with a solution to the ethnic conflict. The Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party member, Mangala Munasinghe, chaired this committee, which met forty-
nine times between 1991 and 1993, but the committee was unable to reach consensus 
other than among the two major parties (SLFP and UNP). However, Mangala 
Munasinghe’s committee was the first time that Parliament had attempted to come up 
with a solution to the ethnic conflict. That being said, reports indicate that many of its 
members did not take the proceedings seriously and, despite the efforts of the chair, the 
recommendations of the commission were stratified along ethnic lines94. While the select 
committee deliberated on measures to strengthen power-sharing arrangements in the 
country and to work out a solution that accommodated the interests of all parties, the 
Premadasa government did not even implement the mechanisms that had been 
established by the constitution for this purpose. 
The Transfer of Powers (Divisional Secretaries) Act of 1992 and the subject of 
“National Policy” were exploited for the benefit of the central government to continue its 
control over the provinces. Divisional secretaries (an administrative office, in which the 
secretary was in charge of the new divisions) were directly under the government and 
were headed by a Divisional Secretary appointed by the central government. This period 
also marked the rise to dominance of the LTTE and the “militarization” of the Sri Lankan 
government’s administration in Tamil-dominated areas in the Northern and Eastern 
provinces of Sri Lanka. In fact, it further marked the first attempt by the Parliament to 
bring a solution to the conflict.  
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Marking an end to the seventeen years of UNP rule in the country, Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (daughter of S.W.R.D and Sirimavo Bandaranayake) became 
the president of Sri Lanka in 1994 with an overwhelming majority. President 
Kumarathunga, who ascended to leadership of the SLFP party in 1993, had a greater 
influence in making fundamental strategic changes within the party and was able to 
persuade its members to adopt a liberal policy on the ethnic conflict. Her SLFP-led 
coalition, The People’s Alliance (PA), campaigned on an explicit peace platform in 1994, 
both at the southern provincial council election and at the parliamentary and presidential 
elections. The PA won an overwhelming mandate for negotiations with the LTTE and for 
constitutional reform to establish maximum devolution. Later, the year 1994 was 
described as a watershed year in politics of the South, mainly because it was the first 
occasion in which a southern political leader won a national mandate on an explicitly 
peace-oriented platform for negotiations and for constitutional reforms for 
decentralization and devolution of powers.95 President Kumaratunga’s government 
commenced negotiations with the LTTE in late 1994, but their talks collapsed soon after 
and war erupted again in April of 1995. During this time, the PA government embarked 
on the “war for peace” strategy. It was the Kumaratunga government that first used this 
strategy.96 
The “War for Peace” strategy called for military containment of the LTTE, whilst 
pursuing a vigorous program of peace-building and constitutional reform proposals aimed 
at winning the support of Tamil community, and thereby, the political alienation of the 
LTTE from its constituency. An extensive program of political education and advocacy 
that emphasized the need for devolution, importance of power sharing, respect for human 
rights and dignity was carried out to counter sensationalist politics and to allay fears of 
separatism. This eventually built the public support to the point that new constitutional 
amendments were proposed. As part of this process, four major proposals were made 
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public during the Kumaratunga government: for Constitutional Reforms in 1995, for the 
devolution of power in January 1996, for a new constitution in October 1995 and for the 
passing of the Constitutional Bill of August 2000.97 Unfortunately, the government failed 
to reach consensus on any of them, which inevitably led to the failure of the entire 
process and left the government with the only option of continuing the warfare with no 
hope of building consensus among the political leaders on state reforms.98 
In such a context, it is evident that the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), which came 
under the next government (the UNP), had its actual ideological beginnings in 1994 with 
the election of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga (SLFP) to the Executive 
Presidency with her pledge to end the ethnic conflict. As a result of the CFA, peace talks 
were initiated in 1994, but failed in 1995 when the LTTE sank a naval craft resulting in 
what the LTTE refers to as the “Third Eelam War.” From 1995 to 2001, the war raged 
across Sri Lanka with suicide bombings in the South and heavy fighting in the North and 
East. However, the tradition of constitutional reform in relation to the devolution of 
power was kept alive throughout this period by the introduction of “Devolution 
Packages” in the form of draft constitutions in 1996, 1997, and 2000. During this time the 
government published proposals describing how the devolution of power of the central 
government would be accomplished and how it would result in a political solution for the 
war.99 
In 2001, general elections were held and the UNP, managing a coalition of other 
minority parties which formed the United National Front (UNF), came back into power 
with Ranil Wickremasinghe (UNF) being sworn in as prime minister. Chandrika 
Bandaranaike Kumaratunge continued to remain as president. Hence, Sri Lanka’s 
government consisted of an executive president headed by one party, the SLFP and the 
legislature controlled by another, the UNF. 
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Ranil Wickremasinghe’s coalition government, following the general election of 5 
December 2001, gave the following assurance in their election manifesto:  
We will end the war and build national unity. We will bring about a 
political solution acceptable to all those who are party to the crisis, within 
the framework of an undivided Sri Lanka…. Once we come to power, we 
will initiate a dialogue with all political parties, the clergy, and civil 
society organizations, in order to arrive at a broad based political solution, 
acceptable to all. We will also involve the LTTE in the process.100 
TheGoSL, with Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge of the SLFP as the 
executive president and Ranil Wickramasinghe of the United National Front alliance as 
the prime minister, entered into a formal “peace process” with the LTTE with the signing 
of the CFA on 23 February 2002.101 However, it is important to note that Prime Minister 
Wickremasinghe did not begin the peace process; the People’s Alliance representatives 
had already been discussing with a neutral party in Norway to facilitate the issue of re-
engaging the LTTE in negotiations,102 while the security forces of the GoSL “suffered a 
humiliating military debacle with unprecedented heavy causalities,” as it was 
triumphantly announced on the LTTE website in April 2001 following a failed offensive 
initiated by the Sri Lankan army.103 Furthermore, the devastating attack carried out by 
the LTTE on the Bandaranaike International Airport in July 2001 hastened the urgency to 
focus on a negotiated settlement. The ensuing Norway-facilitated negotiations led to an 
understanding with the government that it would take steps to remove restrictions on 
certain items that were, at the time, prohibited from being taken to LTTE-dominated 
areas in Wanni (this prohibition was described by the LTTE as “an economic blockade of 
the Tamil areas.”)104 Hence, it is evident that the negotiations between the LTTE and the 
GoSL commenced informally even prior to the election in December 2001 and they 
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involved the People’s Alliance (PA) headed by President Kumaratunge with the help of 
her foreign minister, a Tamil moderate politician, Lakshman Kadiragamar.105 
It should be noted that it was the LTTE that first announced a ceasefire on 19 
December 2001. In a formal statement, the organization announced a month long 
unilateral cessation of hostilities as a gesture of goodwill during the holiday season, in 
order to facilitate and promote initiatives towards a peace process. The GoSL responded 
favorably to the announcement and made a similar offer to commence a ceasefire on 24 
December for one month. Norway brokered a formal ceasefire agreement that was signed 
on 23 February 2002. Starting from September 2002, there were six rounds of talks 
between the GOSL and the LTTE in Thailand, Norway, and Japan. Although the LTTE 
stated that it was committed to peace and that it would respect the CFA, it withdrew its 
representation from talks with the GOSL and from the Subcommittee on Humanitarian 
and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East in April 2003. The LTTE is said to have 
had dual motives for this. First, they felt trapped into committing to a negotiated 
settlement on critical political issues by the international community.106 Second, they 
reasoned that their exclusion from the Washington Conference on Donors held on the 15 
April 2003 was an insult. 107 The LTTE was not allowed into this conference because the 
US had the LTTE still listed as a foreign terrorist organization during Sri Lanka’s peace 
process and the donor conference in Washington. 
The LTTE put forward the Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) proposals 
after it rejected three GOSL proposals for interim arrangements for the North and East.108 
The LTTE adopted a stubborn, hard-bargaining strategy by utilizing their ISGA proposals 
as a “minimum fallback achievement,” which had to be instituted and made functional 
before any talks on a political solution commenced.109 
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Vellupillai Prabhakaran’s LTTE “Hero’s Day” speech on 27 November 2004 
provided a good indication about where the CFA was going. He ended it by saying: 
We cannot continue to be entrapped in a political vacuum without an 
interim solution or a permanent settlement, without a stable peace and 
without peace of mind. The Sinhala nation neither assimilates nor [sic] 
integrates our people to live in co-existence nor does it allow our people to 
secede and lead a separate existence. We cannot continue to live in the 
darkness of political uncertainty, without freedom, without emancipation, 
without any prospects for the future. There are borderlines to patience and 
expectations. We have now reached the borderline…If the Government of 
Sri Lanka rejects our urgent appeal and adopts delaying tactics, 
perpetuating the suffering of our people, we have no alternative other than 
to advance the freedom struggle of our nation.110 
This, along with the government’s resolution that it would not accept threats and 
conditions for talks with the LTTE, indicated that both parties were once again drifting 
towards hostile stances.111 It must be emphasized that the CFA was true to its literal 
implication: it was an agreement to “cease” the “fire [hostilities]” between two sides. It 
provided a situation in which there was “no war, no peace.”112 This did not suit the LTTE 
politically because, as in the case of the South, the ordinary people in the North and the 
East felt that they were not receiving their “material share” of peace and they were 
becoming restless.113 In regards to this, Professor S.D Muni emphasized that the LTTE 
suffered due to this dynamic: “The LTTE’s credibility is getting eroded and they have no 
adequate answers to the questions of rehabilitation and resettlement of the Tamil 
people.”114 
Politics directly, or indirectly, influences everything, including the peace process. 
Although the Sri Lankan people, including sections of the Sri Lankan business 
community and international players, drove the UNF government towards peace 
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negotiations, one of the key drivers during the peace process was the political ambition of 
UNF Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe. His primary objective while continuing the 
peace process was to marginalize his SLFP rival (incumbent President Chandrika 
Banadaranike Kumaratunge), secure Sinhala and Tamil votes through the CFA period of 
four years, and become president at the next presidential election.115 To achieve this 
purpose, the UNF government had two main strategies. The first involved engaging, 
accommodating, and conceding to the LTTE. The second strategy was to utilize the 
international communities’ support to prevent a destabilization of the UNF government 
due to pressure from either the PA or the LTTE.116  
There were a number of instances where the UNF government went astray. One 
such incident was the recognition of the LTTE as the “sole representative of the Tamil 
people” and the recognition of the right to internal self-determination. These were done 
purely to keep the LTTE happy. Meanwhile, the USA, UK, EU, Japan, and India gave 
considerable support to the UNF government, including the 2003 promise of 4.5 billion 
U.S. dollars in economic assistance with one-third of it reserved for the Northern and 
Eastern provinces conditional to the continuation of the peace process.117  
However, the relationship between the UNF government and the SLFP presidency 
continued to wane. In a conflict situation, it is essential that all parties are continuously 
consulted and kept engaged, especially in a Sri Lankan political system, which requires 
the support of almost all “Sinhala” political parties to formulate a political solution for 
the ethnic conflict due to socio-demographic electoral dynamics and constitutional 
constraints.118 This did not occur within the GoSL during the CFA period on a number of 
occasions. For example, it is common knowledge in Sri Lanka that the provisions of the 
CFA between the GoSL and the LTTE were not revealed to President Kumaratunge until 
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twenty-four hours before it was signed.119 The reason for this was that the UNF 
government overplayed its strategy to marginalize the PA which resulted in President 
Kumaratunge taking over the portfolios of Defense, Interior, and Mass Communications 
based on a constitutional mandate given to the president to safeguard Sri Lanka’s security 
and sovereignty.120  
Ultimately, the UNF government was dissolved and elections were held in April 
of 2004. The Sinhala nationalistic movements and the Marxist JVP decided to back the 
President and her SLFP in the parliamentary election against the UNP, who the majority 
of the Sinhalese population saw as weak and giving in to the LTTE during their short-
term in government. Both the CFA and the Interim Self-Governing authority for the 
LTTE was seen as betrayal of the Sinhalese people and the Sinhalese felt it showed the 
UNP leadership giving in to the demands of the LTTE. The 2004 elections proved that 
this was the growing feeling among the majority. After just four years in power, the UNP 
lost the parliament to the United People’s Freedom Alliance (a coalition of the 
President’s SLFP, Communist Left wing parties, Marxist JVP, and the Buddhist monks 
of the “Jathika Hela Urumaya “[JHU]).  
The new parliament, with the UPFA government established and the president 
back in full power of the country, appointed Lakshman Kadiragamr (who was later 
assassinated by the LTTE) as the foreign minister and Mahinda Rajapaksa as the prime 
minister. Table 1 shows the composition of the parliament after the elections of 2004.121 
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The new government, under the leadership of President Kumaranathunga, 
continued to carry-out the provisions of CFA and the peace negotiations mainly due to 
pressure from the Norway-led international community and also because they did not 
want to start immediate military action. Meanwhile, the LTTE (even with the continued 
violations of the CFA) was showing willingness to continue the peace negotiations.122 In 
2005, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka deliberated over the term durations of the 
president; a ruling that brought President Kumaranatunga’s second term in office to an 
end just one year short of the allocated six.123 The next presidential elections were 
scheduled for November 2005. After many doubts and criticism over his hardline 
Sinhalese roots, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa was selected by the UPFA to run in 
the election. The Prime Minister and, now presidential candidate, managed to strengthen 
and revive the volatile relationships between his party and the JVP in order to gain JVP’s 
backing at the elections. UNP leader and former Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe 
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was the key opposition contestant. The election of 2005 was a close race between the 
Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition. The Prime Minister Rajapaksa was aided 
by a late decision by the LTTE to force a boycott of the election in areas under their 
control. With the majority of people in the South supporting Rajapaksa, as the candidate 
who opposed the CFA and the division of the country, he was elected the new president 
of Sri Lanka.124 
President Rajapaksa hailed from a southern Sinhalese political dynasty, which, in 
the post-independent Ceylon, had been active but subdued. His uncle, D.M. Rajapaksa, 
was elected to both the first and second State Councils, pre-independence, as a 
representative of their ancestral home Hambanthota. At the time of his death, D.M. 
Rajapaksa was still the representative for Hambanthota. D.M.’s brother, D.A. Rajapaksa, 
was invited by the local population to contest the seat made vacant by D.M.’s death. He 
is the father of the current President. D.A. Rajapaksa was also the first member of the 
Parliament to crossover to the opposition along with S.W.R.D. Banadaranayake, making 
him a founding member of the SLFP. This gave the Rajapakasa family a claim for the 
leadership and domination of the party politics, second only to the founders’ children, 
both former President Chandrika Bandaranayake Kumaranathuga and her brother, former 
minister and speaker of the House of Parliament, Anura Bandaranayake. The Rajapaksa 
Dynasty took pride in associating itself with the grass root Sinhalese majority in the 
South. Unlike the Banadaranayakes, who considered themselves part of the Sinhalese 
elite of the island, the Rajapaksas were considered to be  “for the people from the 
people.” This was an evident trait of President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s; from his very early 
years as a human rights lawyerto his initiatives as the Minister of Labor, such as the 
introduction of legislation meant to empower the working class, to his action to introduce 
housing projects for the slum-dwelling fishermen during his tenure as the Minister of 
Fisheries. This trait proved invaluable to him in the long run.  As president, Rajapaksa 
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continued to state his belief in a political solution and continued to pursue the solution 
through the CFA under the leadership of his predecessor, President Kumaratunga.125 
However ethnic violence broke out in Trincomalee in April 2006 with the 
explosion of a LTTE bomb in a crowded market place filled with people getting ready for 
the forthcoming Sinhala and Tamil New Year. Ethnic tensions were at a tipping point in 
Trincomalee as they had been building up in preceding months. In response to the 
incident, the Sinhalese community went on a rampage through the town, burning down 
Tamil business establishments and injuring and killing Tamil people in the streets. 
University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR) subsequently reported that; “The Sri 
Lanka Security forces did nothing to stop the mobs for several hours.”126 There were 
justifiable concerns that these incidents would result in another “Black Friday.” However, 
the situation was normalized rapidly, although the tensions prevailed. Subsequent to an 
attack at the entrance to the Army Hospital on 25 April 2006 in an attempt to kill the 
Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka, the Sri Lankan Air Force responded with an 
air attack on a LTTE base in Sampur located in the Trincomalee District of the Eastern 
Province. Confrontations between the LTTE and GOSL continued, but it was the LTTE’s 
decision to not open sluice gates in Maavil Aru, located in the Trincomalee–Batticaloa 
border, that caused an escalation of violence by the GoSL. Closing of the sluice gates 
resulted in Sri Lanka being on the brink of a human rights catastrophe. The Maavil Aru 
provided water to the entire province and would have caused irreparable damage to lives 
and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands.  For this reason, the GoSL was compelled to 
step up the offensive and they began the final stage of the Eelam War, which has later 
been referred to as the humanitarian effort on the part of GoSL by the President and the 
government. This resulted in the de facto end of the CFA.127  
                                                 
125 The president’s official web site carries a profile of the president which can be found at 
http://www.president.gov.lk/mahinda_rajapaksa.php. 
126 “UTHR (J) Information Bulletin,” no. 28, February 2007, accessed February 18, 2012, 
http://www.uthr.org/bulletins/bul28.htm. 
127 While the GoSL and the LTTE did not officially withdraw from the CFA at the time of  the Maavil 
Aru incident, it was clear that, with the military operations underway and the LTTE’s response to it, the 
CFA was no longer in affect other than on paper. The GoSL officially withdrew from the CFA in 2008, at 
which time military operations had been going on for 2 years. 
 41
The CFA might have been a success in the short term, when both parties actually 
adhered to it, but this was only in the first few days and eventually both parties violated 
the terms of the agreement. Although it is a fact that the CFA and the peace process 
gained the support of the South at the time of its signing and even during its initial few 
months, the three main actors in the process: the UNF government, the LTTE, and 
Norway, along with the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), failed to retain public 
support. Further, these groups lacked the ability to counter criticisms against the CFA, 
and the ability to resolve and rectify mistakes they made within the process. In the 
meantime, the campaign against the CFA gathered a lot of momentum among the Sri 
Lankan people (from ordinary people to educated professionals to the military). This was 
a sentiment helped by the constant violation of the CFA, to which neither the SLMM nor 
the facilitator (Norway) could take any action apart from reporting on the violations to 
the media. Emotional stimulus among the majority population of the country paved the 
way for the final phase of open war on 16 January 2008 following the unilateral 
withdrawal of the GoSL from the CFA. 
In a concerted campaign of combat operations, the military was soon able to clear 
the Eastern Province of the LTTE with the aid of the a breakaway group of the LTTE 
named “Karuna fraction.” Its leader Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan known by his nom 
de guerre Colonel Karuna Amman was the top LTTE military leader in the East before 
his defection. The East was cleared in June 2007 and the military campaign was renewed 
in Vanni, Northern Sri Lanka. The Vanni operations gathered momentum with a series of 
victories by Sri Lankan ground forces assisted by superior air power. Meanwhile, 
politically-stirred ethnic sensitivities and a well cultivated “us versus them” dichotomy 
that was well marketed via state media laid a solid rationale for the Sri Lankan 
government to bypass criticisms on the increase cost of living, the violation of 
humanitarian law, and the death and displacement of thousands of civilians during the 





for any dialogue or peace negotiations with the group. Once begun, the Sri Lankan war 
would end in a grand finale steeped in state triumphalism over a non-state actor in 19 
May 2009.128 
President Rajapaksa’s manifesto prior to the election in 2005, called “Mahinda 
Chinthana” (Mahinda Vision), did not specifically state that he would move away from 
the peace negotiations or the CFA, but it was critical of the CFA and stated that, when 
elected, he would: 
Present a specific time frame and a clear agenda to the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam in order to recommence discussions. Our agenda which 
shall be open and transparent, shall include vital concerns such as 
renouncing separatism, demilitarization, entry in the democratic process, a 
discussion towards a final solution and the implementation of such 
solution.129 
While clearly not stating the recommencement of hostilities, Rajapaksa wanted an 
“undivided country, a national consensus and an honorable peace.”130 This manifesto 
also addressed the military personnel and steps to uplift the status and welfare of the 
active members and veterans of the military. While the manifesto outlined moves towards 
the development of the country and other concerns, it was very clear that if Rajapaksa 
was elected to office, his primary concern was the ethnic conflict. For example, when 
hostilities started, this action would be the number one priority for the government. This 
was different from previous situations when there were parallel interests for the 
government in power. The government led by Rajapaksa utilized media and press to of 
create and sustain support for the military operations. For the first time in Sri Lankan 
history, war correspondents and media units were allowed to be embedded with the units 
fighting in the front lines. 
Additionally, the government initiated projects to uplift the military to a new 
social status that had not existed prior to that time. Housing projects for fallen and injured 
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published prior to the 2005 Presidential Election accessed February 18, 2012, 
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soldiers and special programs to funnel support from around the world (mainly from ex-
pats) were launched to motivate the fighting men.  During this time, Rajapaksa also 
managed to strengthen his government’s majority in the Parliament by means of drawing 
opposition members into the ruling coalition party. The UNP lost most of its senior 
members, including its deputy leader, who, among others, crossed-over to the 
government in support of the military action.131 With the government’s power 
consolidated in the parliament, the President was free to continue the military action.  
It was also made clear from the beginning by the media and through other means 
that military actions were not aimed at the Tamil population. The government’s efforts 
were referred to as a humanitarian operation that was intended to liberate the people, 
Tamil and others, from the oppression and terror of the LTTE. The war’s slogan was that 
the military action “was not against Tamil people but against the LTTE.”132 The 
government carried this slogan all throughout the conflict and it is emphasized still.  
LTTE did not help its cause with continued suicide terrorist attacks which enabled the 
government to mold its image and demonize the LTTE’s actions to the Sri Lankan and 
global population. Clearly, this initiative proved a success. Additionally, the LTTE 
gained brief control over its territories during the CFA and its actions during that time to 
control and establish a government were instrumental in eroding the LTTE’s legitimacy 
among their own constitutes. The introduction of taxation, LTTE police, and the 
oppression that the LTTE leadership projected onto its own population helped the cause 
of the government.133 
The government’s military actions gained popular support within the country. 
This was clearly demonstrated at the presidential elections of 2010. The UNP had lost the 
support of the people and was forced to consider a coalition. The opposition parties, 
                                                                                                                                                 
130. Ibid. 
131 “Karu UNP deputy leader,” accessed February 18, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2008/12/081208_unp_karu.shtml. 
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133 Stephen L. Battle, “Lessons In Legitimacy: The LTTE End Game Of 2007–2009,” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
 44
understanding the popular political support that the military success had brought the 
President, decided to create a coalition. This coalition put forward the former 
Commander of the Army, who led the SLAF Army against the LTTE as the challenger to 
the incumbent President Mahinda Rajapaksa. General Sarath Fonseka (a battle hardened 
veteran who miraculously survived a suicide attempt on his life and returned to active 
duty) was President Rajapaksa’s weapon of choice during the war. Prior to his 2006 
appointment to the highest command in the Army, Fonseka was two weeks older than the 
compulsory retirement age but he was given a presidential extension of service. After the 
war ended, the General had a falling out with the President and his brother, the Defense 
Secretary, over a the power and authority over the armed forces. The General was poised 
at gaining more authority and power over the Military than he was afforded by the 
Government. 
Fearing a coup and understanding the popularity the military action had brought, 
the President and the Defense Secretary forced the General into the nominal, powerless 
post of Chief of Defense Staff, where he was forced to retire from service.134 General 
Fonseka contested for the presidency as the victorious General who single handedly 
thwarted the LTTE, while President Rajapaksa contested as the victorious president who 
was the first and only president to unify the country and thwart the LTTE. Both 
campaigns were based on the military victory because Fonseka and Rajapaksa realized 
the importance of the victory and the historical and emotional affect it had on the people 
and the vote.  The election clearly showed how much the end of the war meant to the 
people of Sri Lanka. 
While internal political dynamics are key in understanding the rise and fall of the 
LTTE, they are only a part of the story. The external political, social, and economic 
changes outside of Sri Lanka have also affected the conflict. 
 
                                                 





III. EXTERNAL INFLUENCE ON THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT 
Cordially I invite those countries that have banned us, to understand the deep aspirations 
and friendly overtures of our people, to remove their ban on us and to recognise our just 
struggle… Not withstanding the dividing sea, Tamil Nadu, with its perfect understanding 
of our plight, has taken heart to rise on behalf of our people at this hour of need. This 
timely intervention has gratified the people of Tamil Eelam and our freedom movement 
and given us a sense of relief. I wish to express my love and gratitude at this juncture to 
the people and leaders of Tamil Nadu and the leaders of India for the voice of support 
and love they have extended. I would cordially request them to raise their voice firmly in 
favour of our struggle for a Tamil Eelam state, and to take appropriate and positive 
measures to remove the ban which remains an impediment to an amicable relationship 
between India and our movement. 
—V. Prabhakaran, LTTE leader in his annual Heroes' Day statement,  
27 November 2008 
This chapter will to retrace the external factors that contributed directly or 
indirectly to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The above quote from the LTTE leader is 
testament to the importance of the external factors. These factors have at times fueled and 
at times suffocated the LTTE’s cause. These same factors have also had a similar impact 
on the success and the failures of the GoSL. While we examine these external influences 
separately from the internal politics for the sake of simplicity, in reality these factors are 
not mutually exclusive. One must also take in to consideration that this research does not 
have the ability to examine all global and regional factors, which may have affected the 
conflict due to the many varied implications of those factors. Therefore, this study 
considers the most relevant external factors in order to focus on the essence of the 
conflict.  
For this thesis, although we will focus on the period 1948 to 2009 the events prior 
to that time frame are also significant. For example, the concept of a separate state for 
Tamil people or a “Dravida desam”135 dated back to colonial times, when Reverend 
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to the Dravidian language family. Populations of speakers of around 220 million are found mostly in 
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Robert Cadwell (1819-1891), a missionary, contended that there was a “fundamental 
difference between north and south Indians, between Aryans or Brahman and Dravidian 
or Tamil language and culture.”136 While this effectively made him the father of south 
Indian nationalism, it also fueled a demand for “India [to] be divided into three separate 
states – Aryan, Muslim and Dravidian.”137 Tamil Nadu and northern Sri Lanka are 
separated only by a 20-kilometer stretch of shallow sea.  As stated by David Little, 
“Tamil Nationalism in Jaffna cannot be seen separate from Tamil nationalism in south 
India by which it has been influenced and on which it has, to some extent, fed.”138 
The Sinhalese in Sri Lanka had a strong tendency to identify with their Aryan 
roots of North Indian heritage, while the Tamils connected naturally with their brethren in 
the southern tip of India.  However, early migration patterns of both people could not 
have been structured to the extent that only Sinhalese descended from Aryans and only 
Tamils descended from southern Indians. Even in the political struggle to gain 
independence, the two ethnic groups have worked with each other and as one for the 
cause of an independent nation. Nationalism, then, was not an old ideal.  The divide-and-
rule policy of the British was the true beginning of the tension between the Sinhalese and 
the Tamils, and did more to instill the communal differences between the two ethnic 
groups than any other event in Sri Lankan history. “The British encouraged this 
separation of the different communities,” since it was to their advantage when controlling 
and maintaining the colonial government in Sri Lanka. 
A. INDIA 
After gaining independence from the Britain, the most influential player in both 
the island’s politics and the communal conflict was India. Their covert and overt, direct 
and indirect involvement from 1953 to present was the most important external influence  
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to affect the Sri Lankan conflict. To better understand India’s involvement with Sri 
Lanka, it is important to understand the varying reasons for India to be interested in its 
southern-most neighbor. 
India, after gaining its independence, was trying to consolidate its status as the 
regional power. In their eyes, China, Pakistan, and the U.S. were all in contention for 
supremacy in the Indian Ocean.139 Sri Lanka’s geographical positioning and natural 
harbors made it a strategically important location for any power that sought to dominate 
the Indian Ocean. Additionally, the Sri Lankan government associated with Western 
powers during the Cold War, while India aligned with the U.S.S.R.  Sri Lanka also 
opened the Trincomalee naval harbor for U.S. naval ships, which India considered a 
threat to the regional security.  From the perspective of many Indian leaders and their 
advisers, destabilization of Sri Lanka was critical for India to maintain regional 
supremacy. 
Another reason that India was interested in Sri Lanka had to do with the close 
connection of the Tamils in Tamil Nadu and in northern Sri Lanka which made the 
conflict in Sri Lanka a politically sensitive issue for the central government of India. The 
south Indian state even provided external sanctuary in which Sri Lankan Tamils could 
conduct their military operations and training, aided by the Indian External Intelligence 
Agency’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).140 The establishment of a separate state 
for Tamils in Sri Lanka, so close to Tamil Nadu, could have a spillover effect where the 
sentiments for a separate state in Tamil Nadu, the “Dravida Desam,” could go 
mainstream again. In response, Prime Minister Nehru introduced the 16th amendment to 
the Indian Constitution, which made it “mandatory for those running for [elected] office 
to take an oath stating that [they] will uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. Since 
then, Tamil Nadu politicians holding office could not campaign for a separate Tamil state 
openly.”141 
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It was initially the state government in Tamil Nadu that supported the Sri Lankan 
Tamil militant groups to maintain training camps in Tamil Nadu. Therefore, when the 
prime minister of India, Indira Gandhi, persuaded M. G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister 
of Tamil Nadu, to close down these training camps, “Ramachandran indicated to her that 
he was unable to do so because the Tamils in south India wanted to help their fellow 
Tamils living across the Palk Straits.” Furthermore, it was a political issue in Tamil Nadu 
where closing down the camps would give, Ramachandran’s main opposition, “M. 
Karunanidhi… a political edge over him.”142 
M. Karunanidhi was supporting militancy in Sri Lanka, the Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organization (TELO) in particular. Both the RAW and the Intelligence Bureau 
(IB)—the internal intelligence agency of India—had reported on the serious ramifications 
for India if a separate Tamil state was created. Because of her weak political presence in 
the southern states, Indira Gandhi could not dismiss Ramachandran nor could she enforce 
the President’s direct rule in Tamil Nadu. Thus, the only option open to the Indian Prime 
Minister was to force the Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayawardhna to open negotiations 
with Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka in hopes of finding a political settlement to the 
issue.143 Unfortunately, the 1983 riots, the personal differences between Indira Gandhi 
and the Sri Lankan president, and the latter’s preference of a military solution all 
contributed to India taking unilateral, covert action in Sri Lanka. The “Sri Lankan 
Operation” was to be two-fold, a covert operation undertaken by the Third Agency and 
an overt political operation undertaken by the Ministry of External Affairs and the prime 
minister’s office. The operation sought to take control of the Tamil militancy and to 
destabilize Sri Lanka.144 The first overt involvement of India in the conflict would come 
after the 1983 Black July riots.145  
The town of Jaffna was the administrative capital of the Northern province and 
also the clandestine seat of LTTE power.  "Operation Liberation" was implemented by 
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the Sri Lankan military to recapture the area of Vadamarachchi and in May of 1987, the 
Sri Lankan military surrounded the Jaffna fort, which was also LTTE stronghold. 
 However, their impending success was derailed when on 26 May 1987, the Indian Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Ghandi, intervened to inform Colombo that India would not allow the 
capture of Jaffna.   
India further intervened by sending a flotilla of Indian boats under Red Cross 
flags “[with] relief supplies to Jaffna,” but the flotilla was blockaded and turned back by 
the Sri Lankan Navy.146 India launched “Operation Poolmalai” which violated Sri 
Lankan air space in order to drop relief supplies from the air. This prompted Sri Lanka to 
give in and allow more relief supplies to be sent via sea, saving the LTTE from certain 
defeat.147 
In July of the same year, LTTE leader Prabakaran was flown into New Delhi 
where he met Prime Minister Gandhi and was briefed on the India–Sri Lanka 
negotiations and the subsequent agreement between the Indian PM and the Sri Lankan 
president. The Indo-Lanka accord allowed Indian military to take over the peacekeeping 
mission in the North and East of Sri Lanka. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), at 
its height, numbered more than 100,000 in the region.  Prabhakaran agreed and signed the 
Indo-Lanka accord to mixed reactions from the Sri Lankan and Indian populace.  Sri 
Lankan politicians, including the prime minister and his cabinet members, boycotted the 
signing, while in India, Prime Minister Gandhi was assaulted while inspecting the guard 
of honor presented to him after the signing of the accord.148  
The major ramifications of the accord included the unification of North and East 
as one administrative unit, the withdrawal and confinement of Sri Lankan military into 
their barracks, the cessation of hostilities, and the surrender of arms by all militant 
groups.149 In truth, out of the main five militant Tamil groups in the region, only four, 
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under the influence of RAW, strictly adhered to the Indo-Lanka accord.  The LTTE, the 
most powerful and most committed to the separatist ideology, only symbolically handed 
over some of their arms and did not disarm fully. Thus, while the Indo-Lanka accord 
established the framework for a solution to the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka, it only served to 
shift the political power of the Tamil militancy from scattered, moderate groups to the 
extremist LTTE.  This transition elevated the LTTE to their self-assumed mantle as the 
"sole representative of the Tamil people.” LTTE recommenced their genocidal attacks 
against the Sinhalese and Muslims in an attempt to remove them from the North and East. 
They also attacked SL military positions that, in turn, forced the IPKF to retaliate. This 
prompted “Operation Pawan,”150 which forced the LTTE to disarm and cease hostilities. 
Indian military action was under criticism by both Sri Lankan and Tamil Nadu 
politicians. Sri Lanka saw it as Indian intervention in internal matters, while Tamil Nadu 
saw it as the Indian military killing and acting against their Tamil brethren to the South. 
The LTTE continued to receive support from Tamil Nadu and, in 1989, Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party leader, Karunanidhi, “a strong supporter of the Sri 
Lankan Tamil Militancy and a separate Dravida nation-state in Tamil Nadu came to 
power in Tamil Nadu India.”151 DMK and its predecessor, the Justice Party, had voiced 
support for a separate Dravidian state during Indian independence and thereafter.  
In Sri Lanka, the JVP began to intensify their political and military status in the 
South.152 President Jayewardene successfully completed his second term in 1989 and 
Prime Minister Premadasa took over as the second executive president of Sri Lanka. 
President Premadasa had been against the Indo-Lanka accord from its inception and so, 
with the hostile political scene due to Indian military presence, he urged IPKF to halt 
military action against LTTE positions. In April 1989, the President invited the LTTE 
into unconditional negotiations. The LTTE accepted and subsequently they and the Sri 
Lankan government started negotiations in Colombo the same year. Shortly thereafter, 
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President Premadasa requested that the IPKF leave Sri Lanka by July 29. In a surprising 
reversal of what happened during Operation Liberation, it was now the Sri Lankan 
politicians who saved the LTTE from military annihilation. In a move intended to force 
India to withdraw their military presence, President Premadasa's government also 
covertly supported the LTTE by sending them military supplies.153 
The last of the IPKF left Sri Lanka in 1990 after almost 1,500 people were killed 
and close to 3,000 were injured in the failed peacekeeping mission in Sri Lanka.154 In a 
last ditch attempt, the RAW and Indian Army formed the Tamil National Army (TNA) to 
replace the IPKF in order to make sure that the area would be under Indian, rather than 
LTTE, control. But the LTTE, with the support of the Sri Lankan government, destroyed 
this military outfit immediately after the IPKF left Sri Lanka. The clandestine support of 
the Sri Lankan government was key in the efforts of the LTTE removing the TNA. With 
the departure of IPKF and the destruction of the TNA, LTTE, for the first time, managed 
to become the dominant force in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka and 
they took over positions vacated by the Indian military.155 
While overtly continuing with the negotiations, the LTTE assumed control in 
Trincomalee, the capital town in the Eastern province. In one of their most violent actions 
to-date, the LTTE’s Eastern wing attacked nine police stations. The government had 
ordered the policemen to surrender, but the LTTE killed over 600 policemen despite their 
compliance.  This left Colombo no other choice but to resume military operations.156 
The year 1991 was  crucial in the path towards the demise of the LTTE. In 
January, the new Indian PM, Chandra Shekar, dismissed Karunanidhi from his position 
as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu due to his ties with the LTTE. The LTTE “Black 
Tigers”—the elite suicide wing of the LTTE—began its operations with a suicide car 
bomb that assassinated Sri Lankan Defense Minister Ranjan Wijerathne. In May of the 
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same year, a female suicide bomber and a member of the Black Tigers assassinated Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi while he was on the campaign trail for reelection.157 
Those responsible, the LTTE supreme leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the LTTE 
head of intelligence, Pottu Amman, and the LTTE strategist, Sivarasan, had all been 
trained by Indian intelligence agencies in covert operations authorized by Rajiv Gandhi’s 
mother, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.  The LTTE’s killing of Rajiv Gandhi, twice 
blessed as the Prime Minister and as a member of the Gandhi dynasty, were instrumental 
in India’s reversal of attitude towards the LTTE.  In 1992, the Indian government decried 
the LTTE as a terrorist organization and “from 1991 onwards, India was forced to pursue 
a “hands – off” policy towards the civil war in Sri Lanka.”158 
It was in the context of a more cooperative regional policy under the Gujral 
Doctrine that the Indian government accepted the involvement of external actors in Sri 
Lankan affairs. Starting in 2000, Norway acted as a mediator between the LTTE and the 
Sri Lankan government, which led to the signing of another ceasefire agreement in 2002. 
The ceasefire established the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which was a group 
composed of “Nordic” states charged with monitoring the ceasefire. Despite its non‐
involvement in these negotiations, India kept a watchful eye on the developments in Sri 
Lanka and was kept continuously informed by Norway about the latest developments in 
the peace process.159  
During these years of Norwegian mediation and the Cease Fire Agreement, the 
goal of “lasting peace” was reaffirmed by India’s quiet support for the peace process. 
From 2003 to 2009, India repeatedly expressed the goal of a “negotiated political 
settlement” which would encompass forms of power devolution in order to meet “the 
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aspirations of all communities.”160 More specifically, India had a clear preference for the 
“unity, sovereignty and integrity” of Sri Lanka.161 Their desire for “the unity of Sri 
Lanka in a federal system,”162 related back to New Delhi’s fear of secessionist spillover 
effects on single Indian states, most notably, Tamil Nadu. 
India’s resolve to remove itself from the conflict changed slightly in the period of 
2007–2009 as there was a move to contain the political pressure on the central 
government by the LTTE-sympathetic state government of Tamil Nadu In 2007, India 
took an indirect, but highly significant role in the military conflict. This new approach 
was manifested in their moves against the Sri Lankan government and in the provision of 
military hardware, mainly in the form of “defensive” equipment.163  
In the years 2007–2009, the Indian and Sri Lankan Navies carried out coordinated 
operations that led to the destruction of at least ten LTTE “floating warehouses,” which 
considerably weakened the Sea Tigers.164 The Indian Navy took over reconnaissance 
missions and the Sri Lankan Navy carried out the strikes.165 Additionally, India provided 
the Sri Lankan government with life‐saving equipment such as flak jackets, an offshore 
patrol vessel in 2007,166 and they “quietly gifted” five helicopters to the Sri Lankan Air 
Force in 2006.”167 The only publicly acknowledged provision of support consisted of two 
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air surveillance radars needed to anticipate LTTE air attacks. But, most importantly, in 
2008, India extended their training facilities to the Sri Lankan armed forces. 168 
Moreover, the Rajapaksa administration initiated a separate dialogue between Sri 
Lanka and India during the initial stages of the Humanitarian Operation (Fourth Eelam 
War) that bypassed the normal diplomatic channel with India. Rajapaksa selected a team 
that would be led by the Presidential Secretary, Lalith Weerathunga, the Defense 
Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, and the senior adviser to the president, Basil Rajapaksa, 
to regularly meet and visit Indian leaders including the Prime Minister, Manmohan 
Singh, the Congress Party General Secretary, Sonia Gandhi, and the External Affairs 
Minister. The objective of these meetings, according to the government, was to keep 
India informed of Sri Lanka’s military campaign in an effort to prevent a repeat of the 
1987 intervention of India. According to Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, 
President Rajapaksa “understood that while other countries could mount pressure on us 
through diplomatic channels or economic means, only India could influence the military 
campaign”169 This, mostly taciturn, support by India for Sri Lanka’s military campaign 
fit New Delhi’s desire for stability and peace in the region.  
After the end of the war, India also diplomatically supported Sri Lanka in 
international forums. On 28 May 2009, a special session of the United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC) was held to investigate the reported war crimes and atrocities 
committed by both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan armed forces. Two motions were 
discussed: one requesting an international investigation, and the other, presented by the 
Sri Lankan government, urging the international community to support Sri Lanka’s 
reconstruction efforts. India, alongside China, Russia, Pakistan, and several Arab and 
African countries voted for it. While this voting behavior goes against India’s traditional 
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preference for non‐involvement in other countries’ internal affairs, it emphasizes India’s 
concern about the fate of the Sri Lankan Tamil civilians. 
B. TAMIL DIASPORA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
The Tamil Diaspora actively supported and kept the separatist ideology alive in 
many Western countries. The Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) specified that the Tamil 
Diaspora “provided [the separatists] with much needed propaganda, financial and logistic 
support for the LTTE and its leadership to survive as one of the most ruthless terrorist 
organizations in the world for more than three decades. With the elimination of the LTTE 
leadership in May 2009, the military might of LTTE too was vanquished. However, the 
Diaspora factor and the LTTE international network still largely remain intact posing a 
potential threat not only to Sri Lanka and the region but also to the peace and stability of 
the world at large.”170 
An insurgency needs “people, money and guns” for its survival and growth, and, 
in the case of the LTTE, the Tamil Diaspora was providing all three of these things.  Over 
1 million Sri Lankan Tamils are located outside of Sri Lanka, of which more than half are 
settled in Canada and the UK. While the majority of the international Tamil community 
is sympathetic to the LTTE cause, only about 10% are actively involved in the 
fundraising efforts.171 
The Tamil Diaspora is made up mostly of the educated Tamil population that 
managed to flee the country during the 1983 Black July communal riots. Most managed 
to find “political asylum in Western and European countries.”172 The LTTE leadership 
“made every effort to gain control over the Tamil Diaspora in its efforts to establish the 
position that the LTTE was the sole representative of Tamils.” Most of the Tamil 
Diaspora members were reluctant to return to Sri Lanka due to the socio-economic 
luxuries they enjoyed internationally. In most countries, the Tamil Diaspora created a 
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labour force and, more importantly, a sizeable vote bank for local politicians. This 
situation was cleverly exploited by the LTTE and pro-LTTE elements, as local votes 
were exchanged for political support of the LTTE. The international Tamil population 
fled the country during the communal riots and their perceptions of the country were 
skewed in terms of their own experiences. Most of them believed that the situation in the 
country for Tamils had only gotten worse since 1983 at the hands of the Sinhalese-led 
government and military. The only connections that they had to the situation in Sri Lanka 
were the LTTE propaganda movements, which described the terrorist activities as 
justified. A wealth of funds was created, which the LTTE’s international network 
managed to tap into very successfully. Interestingly, in identifying the contemporary 
nature of the Diaspora, scholars have pointed out that these communities, in general, do 
not necessarily yearn to return home.  Instead, they articulate their primary connections 
through a symbolic homeland. This was especially apparent with the Tamil Diaspora. 173 
While the Tamil Diaspora supported the LTTE with most of their financial, 
propaganda, and logistical support, the Tamil Diaspora’s most crucial contribution was in 
getting Western political influence involved with the conflict. To this end, by creating 
lobby groups and voting banks in Western countries and sometimes having members 
from their own community in the legislature of countries such as the UK and Canada, the 
Diaspora managed to pressure the political powers of these countries to influence the 
proceedings of the conflict.174  
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Country Tamil Diaspora 
Canada            380,000 
UK 300,000 
India           150,000 




USA                35,000 
Italy            23,000 
Malaysia   20,000 
Netherlands  15,000 
Norway               12,000 
Denmark        7,000 
New Zealand   3,000 
Sweden       2,500 
Belgium   800  
Finland          700 
Table 2.   Distribution of the Tamil Diaspora 
The support the LTTE managed to get from the Tamil Diaspora was so substantial 
that it lessened the LTTE’s dependence on local support and, as a result, the LTTE lost 
some legitimacy for their cause with the local population.175 This study shows the extent 
of the support the LTTE was receiving from their international network and primarily 
from the Tamil Diaspora.  
As for the LTTE’s finances, they maintained an international financial network 
consisting of money exchange offices and couriers across Europe to ensure that money 
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collected was channeled to meet the LTTE’s war budget without being detected by 
authorities. Saana Chandran, also known as Saana Group, is responsible for running this 
financial network under the direct supervision of Veerakulasingham Manivannan, also 
known as Castro. The income of LTTE during the period between 1993 and 2002 is 
estimated at US$50–75 million annually. From 2002 to 2007, the annual income 
exceeded US$200 million.176 
The LTTE generated funds mainly from its front organizations as well as through 
legal and illegal business ventures such as international shipping lines, real estate, 
supermarkets, filling stations, drug smuggling, and human trafficking. The money 
collected was transferred mostly through people coming into Sri Lanka and, in some 
cases, through banking systems (i.e., Western Union). In the last few years, more than ten 
LTTE suspects have been arrested in Europe and Southeast Asia in connection with 
money laundering offenses committed during this period in Sri Lanka. It has also been 
observed that since May 2009, the LTTE fundraising ability has decreased by 80%.  
Despite the 80% reduction, the LTTE front organizations still manage to meet their 
functional expenses and organize various public events to mobilize the support of the 
Diaspora and international communities for its cause. It would be of interest to identify 
sources of funding of these front organizations and their motives as these funds are being 
used not only to promote LTTE ideology and separatism, but also to strengthen terrorist 
networks across the globe in the pretext of helping affected Tamils in Sri Lanka.177 
The attacks of 9/11 changed the global perception of the LTTE. More than 
32 states decried the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) after 9/11. This 
was the direct result of an effective anti-terrorism campaign led by the United States. 
With regard to the conflict in Sri Lanka, the events of 9/11 hindered the operations of the  
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LTTE in the international terrain. However, to date, the Diaspora has not abandoned their 
strong nationalist feelings and they continue to support the LTTE cause even in the 
absence of an LTTE.  
The September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers and Pentagon changed the entire 
approach of the U.S. foreign and domestic policy toward terrorist organizations. The 
degree of exclusion did not match its peak, which occurred from 2006 to 2007 after a 
number of LTTE attacks on innocent civilians including Foreign Minister Lakshman 
Kadirgamar, a liberal minded Tamil. Still, the majority of governments in the Western 
states were no longer interested in aiding any non-state organization engaged in 
terrorism-related activities.  
While only two countries had declared LTTE a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) prior to 9/11 (India in 1992 and the United States of America in 1997), the list 
eventually expanded to include:   
 The UK (February 2001), 
 UNSC (2005), 
 Canada (April 2006), and 
 The European Union (May 2006). 
Rigid state actions were imposed, causing fear among the Tamil Diaspora which 
reduced the funds sent to LTTE. In October 2001, Canadian police arrested 40 Tamil 
gang members, reputed to fundraise for the LTTE, in a series of raids in Toronto.178 
Following these arrests, Thai authorities arrested and imprisoned three Tamil LTTE 
operatives attempting to buy weapons in Thailand. In 2006, a combined operation 
between the FBI and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) set out to track down 
several Tamils who were assumed to have had connections with the LTTE. They had 
tried to bribe state department officials and they had also attempted to purchase shoulder-
fired surface to air missiles.179 Additionally, in 2007, the Tamil Television Network was 
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banned by Intelsat Ltd, a Washington-based company.  The network was moved to Paris; 
however, under the provisions of FTO, French authorities banned it there as well.  
Eventually, as the final stages of the Sri Lankan Civil War began, the LTTE lost 
its international financial backing as fundraising via the Diaspora became illegal under 
the international law.180 The external influence and the changes in the regional and global 
perspective on Terrorism did contribute to the demise of the LTTE. But the most 
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IV. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
This chapter discusses the transformation of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces 
(SLAF) before and during the years of the conflict with the LTTE. It will trace a linage 
that dates back to the independence of Sri Lanka from the British, to May 2009, when the 
President declared victory over the LTTE. The transformation to adopt to the LTTE spans 
a time frame from the beginning of the Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka during the 1970s to 
end of the Eelam War IV. The conflict with the Tamil militancy and the LTTE has been 
separated in to four phases due to the different cease-fires and negotiation efforts, which 
took place. This chapter will attempt to understand these changed of the military and the 
reasons for success of these adaptations during the Eelam war IV. The study by John 
Ngal outlined in the chapter I will guide this study to show the effects of the adaptations 
and the organizations (GoSL and SLAF) ability to accept adaptations based of lessons 
learned. 
A. THE BEGINNING OF A SRI LANKAN MILITARY 
During the British colonial period, they set up the first rudimentary elements of a 
“Ceylon” military, the Ceylon Rifle Regiment purely for ceremonial duties, in 1796.  The 
army did not include local inhabitants but consisted mostly of imported Malays. In 1874, 
the Ceylon military was determined superfluous and the Malays became the first police 
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In 1881, the British formed the Ceylon Light Infantry Volunteers (CLIV) with 
Europeans and Ceylonese under the honorary command of the Prince of Wales. Today 
SLAF Army sees this as their beginning. In 1910 the CLIV was renamed Ceylon Defense 
Force and mobilized in 1914 in response to the WWI. The Ceylonese’s only preformed 
guard duties during the First World War. During the Second World War, Indian troops 
under British control were brought to protect Ceylon from Japanese invasion.  After the 
surrender of Japan, Ceylon was no longer strategically relevant and the Ceylon Defense 
Force was demobilized. The Royal Air Force handled air security roles; no Ceylonese 
men were eligible to join the force. The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (CRNVR) was 
established due to wartime requirements and Sinhalese and Tamil received training from 
the British.182 
When Ceylon was granted dominion status in 1948, the country knew the 
formation of a capable military of its own would take time. Fearing a threat to the 
sovereignty of the island from its lager, and powerful neighbor, India, Ceylon entered in 
to the British Commonwealth and on 11 November 1947 signed a “Defense and External 
Affairs Agreement.”183 
The postcolonial government recognized that its military could not defend the 
country, or its government because of the small size of the Army and the Navy and the 
almost non- existent Air Force. The Army Act, in 1949, created the Royal Ceylon Army 
with both regular and volunteer forces. At the request of the government, a British officer 
initially sent as an adviser, took command of the Army as its first commander. The 
government also established a Royal Ceylon Air Force (RCAF) with an ex-Royal Air 
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Royal Ceylon Navy was formed with the use of men from the CRNVR on 9th December 
1950 with the passing of the Ceylon Navy Act. The HMCeyS Vijaya was the only vessel 
in its command.185 
The armed forces were incapable of truly protecting the country and with no signs 
of eminent conflict, resorted to the “guard[ing] the coast and air space of the island and 
the assist[ing] the police in internal security duties, for static guards and ceremonial 
duty.”186  
During the 1960s, the military attempted two coups to replace the government in 
power. Though the attempts were unsuccessful, they made the government question the 
loyalty of the armed forces and were instrumental in hampering the modernization of the 
military. The government had begun to reevaluate the defense policy of the country.187 
The first true test for the military came in 1971 with the JVP insurrection. “For 
the first time in post-independence history, the Army was involved in active combat.”188 
After several months of vicious fighting, the army managed to defeat the insurgents, 
however not without many of their flaws coming to light.  For the first time, the 
government accepted assistance in the form of military aid from communist countries. 
China facilitated the purchase of five patrol boats, twelve artillery pieces and small arms, 
while the USSR provided the funds for the purchase of six MiG fighters, two helicopters, 
and ten BTR-152 with spare parts and ammunition.189 
In 1972, the country renounced its dominion status with the British and renamed 
itself the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. During this time, Tamil militancy 
was also intensifying its activities in the North and East. The Army’s mission began to 
focus on the defense of the country from internal conflict. By the turn of the 1970s, the 
military as engaged in conducting operations against the Tamil Militant groups operating 
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in the North and East. LTTE, TELO and PLOT were the most prominent groups. There 
was no single, or primary militant group that the military targeted during this time. Many 
of the groups were conducting hit and run operations and most were considered criminal 
groups rather than full blown insurgent movements.190 
On the 23 July 1983, 13 soldiers of the Sri Lanka Army were ambushed and killed 
by the LTTE at Thirunelveli, in Jaffna. This single event is considered to be the 
beginning of the Eelam war. The LTTE was becoming the most prominent militant force 
in the region, partially through the attacks on the Sri Lankan government and partially by 
eliminating its competition.  
The first offensive military operation in the military history of Sri Lanka was 
launched on 26 May 1987. “Operation Liberation” proposed to gain control of the 
Vadamarachchi area in the Jaffna peninsula. It was comprised of two brigades, under the 
command of Lt. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and Maj. Gen. Vijaya Wimalarathne, who 
successfully captured the Vadamarachchi area in five days. Even at the very beginning of 
the war, the LTTE had no way of withstanding a conventional war against the Sri Lankan 
military.  The second phase of the operation was to gain control of the entire Jaffna 
peninsula. With the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord and the arrival of the Indian Peace 
Keeping Force (IPKF) in 1987, the SLAF Army was forced to withdraw from the North 
and East.191  
While the other militant groups, most of them trained by the RAW, decided to 
surrender and hand-over their arms, the LTTE resisted. . With the growing resentment in 
the country to the IPKF presence, the President requested the Indian government to 
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withdraw its troops. The Sri Lankan government covertly supplied arms to the LTTE in 
order to fight the IPKF, and force India to withdraw.192 
Since the military establishment in the North and East was withdrawn, and with 
the IPKF’s return to India, the LTTE managed to destroy the Indian backed Tamil 
National Army and gain overall control of the North and East. With LTTE in full control, 
the Sri Lankan military was forced to obtain passes and permission to travel in the area.  
Whenever the army had to venture out, a pass had to be obtained from the 
LTTE… Officer [SLAF] had to stop at every checkpoint to show his pass 
to the LTTE… Most of the Senior [SLAF Military] officers refrained from 
travelling outside their camps, to avoid embarrassment.193  
Under the CFA of 1990, the LTTE fortified their defenses and formed 
conventional military capability and defense lines. The LTTE actually violated this 
agreement but the Sri Lankan military remained unresponsive.  The LTTE and the 
government held talks prior to the Eelam War II. After the negotiation efforts failed in 
June 1990, the first outbreak of violence was reported in Ampara and Batticaloa areas 
where large numbers of police personnel were captured and slaughtered by the LTTE. 194 
Two brigades were launched under the command of Brigadier R. De .S. 
Daluwatte, the Area Commander for Ampara and Batticaloa, and Lieutenant Gen 
Kobbekaduwa, responsible for the operations in the Eastern Province. The 1st Brigade 
Group was tasked to reinforce the Kalavanchikudi camp held by a company of 6th 
Battalion, Sri Lanka Light Infantry, while the 3rd Brigade Group was assigned to 
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reinforce the Kiran camp held by a company of the 1st Battalion, The Gemunu Watch. In 
a week’s time, the two brigades were able to break the siege on the two camps.195  
The northern Army bases were Palaly, Jaffna Fort, Mankulam, Kokavil, Elephant 
Pass, Mullaithivu, Kilinochchi and Mannar. Due to the presence of the IPKF and the 
subsequent peace talks, the numbers in the bases, and the perimeters in the larger camps 
like Palaly were reduced. The lack of a land route forced the Army to depend on the Air 
Force for troop reinforcements and combat supplies. The air strip in Palaly was directly 
under the enemy. However the determined pilots of the Sri Lanka Air Force were able to 
bring in reinforcements despite a heavy volume of enemy fire. Operation JAYASHAKTI 
was launched to regain the Palaly camp in order to facilitate aircraft landing.196 
 “Operation Tiger Hunt” was initially designed in three phases to gain ground lost 
in the north after the IPKF intervention. After the completion of the Phase I, the 
government’s  
emphasis changed all of a sudden, from North to East. [and] Gen. 
Kobbekaduwa [General in Command North: Major General Denzil 
Kobbekaduwa] had to manage with whatever resources available and 
protect some isolated camps besides providing protection to threatened 
villages.197   
The lack of sufficient military was a key issue faced during the war before 2006.  Often 
operations directed at one province would deplete the resources of the other, giving the 
LTTE the ability to oscillate between the two provinces. 
From June 1990 (the outset of Eelam War II) to the declaration of the third cease-
fire agreement on 8 January 1995, the Sri Lankan government forces managed to 
successfully align the conventional full-scale operations in either the North or East.  The 
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LTTE began to use unconventional and semi-conventional tactics. These included suicide 
attacks followed by raids. Unceasing waves of attacks using suicide troops on the first 
few waves to break through the forward defenses, and use of improvised armored 
vehicles (earth moving equipment rigged to provide cover to raiding forces, etc.). At the 
same time, the LTTE continued to attack Naval targets using suicide divers, and 
conducted well-planned terrorist attacks on the country’s capital Colombo and other 
areas. The LTTE managed to assassinate the President, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who had 
earlier supported the LTTE and armed the LTTE in their fight against the IPKF. President 
Premadasa was assassinated on 1 May 1993 on Armour Street, in Colombo while 
attending a May Day march. This was the second successful assassination of a head of 
state by the LTTE, and the first by a terrorist outfit.198 
From the start of the Eelam War II, the SLAF noticed the need for a modernized 
weapon system to fight the LTTE. The current arsenal was in poor condition and difficult 
to find ammunition for the older models of weapons that had gone out of date.  Western 
countries during this time refused to sell newer weapons to Sri Lanka.  The SLAF had to 
look to China and the former Soviet countries for armament. The new weapons required 
considerable time spent on training, a hurdle that the Army had to overcome to fight 
efficiently.199 In 1990, the army had the strength of 50,000 men, almost half of which 
were mobilized volunteers. The numbers KIA and MIA, combined with those who had 
deserted, hampered the growth of the Army.  The Navy did not have the same hardships 
in retention because it was not strictly involved in the combat. Rather the Navy’s mission 
was to support the Army by providing supplies to the cut-off bases in Jaffna by sea and 
prevent supplies and support from south India. The Navy also updated its fleet and for the 
first time Dvora crafts were added to the fleet to replace the aging patrol boats.200 
In 1994, the People’s Alliance, a coalition led by the SLFP came to power. 
During the elections held in November same year, the incumbent Prime Minister 
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Kumaranathunga was elected fourth Executive President of Sri Lanka, and the 
Commander-in-Chief. The President wanted to try her hand at peace negotiations with 
the LTTE at first, especially with the war causing mass causalities and creating economic 
problems. The President came to power on a platform of restarting peace negotiations and 
bringing about an end to the war.  
The government did not withdraw its positions and the troops were put on alert 
during the cease-fire. This was a lesson learned from the past instances of cease-fire and 
negotiations with the LTTE who spent the temporary peace building up both their human 
and material requirements for future wars. The government also formulated plans for 
offensive and defense operations and plans for procurement to be used if the LTTE 
backed out of the peace talks. Still, they were unable to prevent the Navy from losing two 
ships harbored inside the main Navy base in Trincomalee. Fully trained suicide frogmen 
of the LTTE planted explosives on Sri Lanka Navy Ships (SLNS) SOORAYA and SLNA 
RANASURU. The new outbreak of violence saw the LTTE advancing its armament to 
include newer weapons including shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The 
LTTE shot down two SLAF Air Force AVRO aircrafts using these new weapons.201 
This event marked the beginning of what is now referred to as Eelam War III. The 
SLAF were prepared to launch an offensive however they were unable to prevent LTTE 
suicide bombers from  infiltrating the government controlled areas. Eelam War III, from 
19 April 1995 and onward, saw the LTTE adopting a “no-taking prisoners”  strategy. An 
example of this was when the LTTE overran the “Mullativu base complex in July 1996 
and killed all surrendered soldiers.” SLAF conducted “Operation Riviresa One,” 
launched on 17 October 1995 to regain control of the Valikamam area of the Jaffna 
peninsula. After an intense battle Valikamam was cut off from the Vadamarachchi and 
Tenamarachchi areas forcing the LTTE to withdraw from Jaffna Town. The new 
government, under a banner of a  "war for peace,” succeeded in bringing Jaffna under Sri 
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Lankan control on 2 December 1995, for the first time in 12 years.202 However, most of 
the LTTE had managed to withdraw after stripping all useable equipment from the 
town.203 
After March 1997, the government pushed a campaign to open a military supply 
route to the Jaffna Peninsula. If successful, the offensive would have split the LTTE 
forces and strengthened the government's bargaining position with both the LTTE and 
Sinhalese extremists. However, like the 50,000 IPKF men before them, 20,000 SLAF 
troops were unsuccessful.  The campaign created a great hardship for the people of the 
region and left another thousand young men dead.204 The Army conducted limited 
clearing operations in the North and East after this until “Operation Jayasikuru [operation 
Definite Victory]” on 13 May 1997. The aim of the operation was to regain control of the 
LTTE stronghold in the Wanni jungle and to open up land routes to link Kilinochchi and 
Wanni districts with Jaffna. This operation also saw a change in SLAF Army’s way of 
war fighting; when it employed most of its divisions and brigades to conduct 
“multidirectional, multipronged” offensives against the enemy. Simultaneously, the 
SLAF launched an offensive aimed at capturing Oddusudan town and the Nedunkerny – 
Oddusudan road which would further restrict the LTTE’s movements. The operation 
succeeded due to the change in strategy.  For the first time since its inception, the SLAF 
Army had conducted two large scale operations in two separate theaters of war.  
Operation Jayasikuru was halted before it could achieve its stated goals in 1999 because 
the leadership of the military and political authority decided to change strategy. Instead 
the Army launched “Operation Ranagosa” in Wanni and Mannar district. The Army 
conducted a series of operations but by reverting to the practice of conducting single 
major offensives in a single operation area, the LTTE was again given freedom to 
regroup and reorganize. After a string of successful attacks on smaller SLAF 
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fortifications which “gifted”205 the LTTE with a considerable weapons and ammunition 
windfall including heavy weapons, the LTTE launched a massive offensive against 
Elephant Pass (also called EPS) at 2.20am on 11 December 1999. By this time, LTTE 
had perfected their notorious “unceasing waves” concept, which called for wave after 
wave of suicide bombers to overwhelm the defenses of a military, while the raiding force 
found a suitable weak point to breakthrough. After this major setback in EPS, SLAF was 
determined to defend Jaffna from falling.206 
Prior to the presidential, election day, on 18 December 1999 the LTTE managed 
to launch another suicide bomber in hopes of assassinating the incumbent president. The 
assassination attempt failed when the President escaped with minor injuries, and the loss 
of one eye.207 She was later reelected for her second term. After this, the SLAF launched 
a series of offensives in hopes limiting the LTTE’s movements. These included 
Operation Kinihira (17 September 200), Operation Kinihira II (26 September 2000), 
Operation Kinihira III and IV (19 November 2000), Operation Kinihira V (16 December 
2000), Operation Kinihira VIII (30 December 2000), Operation Kinihira XI (06 January 
2001). These operations managed to capture the area conceded to the LTTE during its 
series of unceasing waves.208With these successful operations, and the changing nature of 
global perception of terrorism and terrorist groups after the 9/11 attacks, the LTTE 
entered into another round of negotiations with the GoSL and declared unilateral cease-
fire.  
The Sri Lankan government was under serious economic disarray after the attack 
on Sri Lanka’s International airport in 24 July 2001, causing $1 billion worth of 
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damage.209The opposition was criticizing the “war for peace” strategy of the government, 
publicizing it as unsuccessful the cause for the country’s economic problems.210The 
LTTE’s ability to cause widespread terror with their suicide bombers during the Eelm 
War III and their successes at some stages of the war helped make the case for the 
opposition. Their propaganda efforts helped the opposition to a victory in the 
parliamentary elections of On 19 December, and with the facilitation of Norway, the 
LTTE announced another 30-day cease-fire and the new government halted all offensive 
military action two days later ending the Eelam War III.211 
During Eelam War III, the GoSL again remained focused on an “annihilation and 
land domination and land grabbing”212 strategy of warfare which was conventional in 
thinking. The aim was to kill the LTTE members and thereby gain control of the land 
held by them. These strategies did not have any COIN aspects and the civil population 
was not a concern for the military when it became clear that the LTTE had infiltrated 
civil society in the areas in question. Also the military had no answer to the suicide 
techniques employed by the LTTE. The government could not ensure security even in 
areas where the war was not being fought. The “biggest problem Army  faced with the 
lack of resources. More than material, the real problem man power.”213 The lack of 
sufficient forces to conduct operations and hold ground was evident from the beginning 
of the conflict but the successive governments did not succeed in addressing this 
deficiency. While the SLAF had a clear strategy of land domination it did not have the 
troops to do this. The other main concern of the military during the Eelam war II and III 
was desertion. By own admission of senior officers serving during this time, one reason 
for “Soldiers desert[ing] the battlefield mainly due to weak and immature leadership.” 
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Other reasons included a lack of continuous training, the administrations inability to 
provide food, basic essentials and leave for soldiers. Wartime recruitment was difficult, 
especially with the weakened status of the military and criticism by the opposition on the 
war. Furthermore the apparent lack of caring for the welfare of the military, especially the 
injured and the families of fallen, did not encourage enlistment.214 
During the war the LTTE managed to utilize its international support and media 
network to the fullest extent. SLAF did not have any experience in handling either public 
relations or media properly. The population was not informed of the successes or failures 
of the military, which was taken advantage of by the LTTE and its media network. 
The intelligence aspect of the military was primitive and in development. The 
different state and military intelligence units did not coordinate or share information with 
one another or with international intelligence agencies properly. Intercepted enemy 
transmissions were considered reliable sources of information making it easy for the 
enemy to supply false information. Because of the nature of the insurgency and their 
tactics, it was difficult for the Sri Lankan military to obtain a true numerical assessment 
of the LTTE’s strength. The military was also at best a novice in the field of 
“psychological operations.”215 
Eelam War III was the end of an era of conventional thinking for the SLAF. 
When the military resumed its offensive in 2006, there is a clear shift in strategy and 
while the military did not abandon its conventional mindset, it began to address the more 
unconventional aspects of the LTTE insurgency.   
The LTTE, on 21 July 2006, while still officially engaged in CFA and 
negotiations, decided to close and hold the Mavil Aru sluice gates in the Eastern 
province. These sluice gates provided water for 30,000 acres of paddy fields and the 
timing of the closing was pre-harvest when water was most needed for farmers 
cultivating these lands. Even prior to this, minor violations had occurred on both sides but 
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had not effected negotiations.216 The military response of the GoSL to the closing of the 
sluice gate was considered the start of the Eelam War IV also known as the 
“Humanitarian Operations” or “Wanni Humanitarian Operation.” For the purpose of this 
research the terms are used synonymously to refer to the military operations by the SLAF 
against the LTTE from July 2006 to May 2009. 
The closing of the Maavil Aru sluice gates gave the GoSL a justifiable reason to 
launch an offensive (while still under the CFA) by citing humanitarian concerns for the 
lives of the farmers dependent on the water that had been blocked.217 The SLAF Army 
Special Forces spearheaded “Operation Watershed.”218 The breakout of violence from 
this operation moved on to Muttur, where on 8 August 2006 the SLAF Army 
Commando’s aided by the SLAF Navy intervened to carry out another operation after 
“LTTE terrorists expelled over 42000 innocent Muslim civilians from Muttur directing 
an attack towards Muttur.”219 While neither the GoSL or the LTTE officially denounced 
the CFA at this time, it was clear full-scale military action had resumed by both sides. In 
fact, it was in January 2008 that the government officially withdrew from the CFA.220 
The fall of the most prominent LTTE strongholds of Toppigalla and Sampur marked the 
end of Tiger domination in the East. The Army conducted its operation along multiple 
lines of operations. The decision to resume offensive military action in the East was for 
several reasons: 
 The enemy positions in Sampur posed the greatest threat to the countries 
largest and main naval base in Trincomalle. These concerns were “backed 
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by a United States Military advisory team which visited the island in 2005 
as well.”221 
 The East has always been multiethnic with a large number of Muslims and 
Sinhalese living among the Tamil majority. 
 The LTTE action in Muttur by attacking civilian and military there and in 
Mavil Aru by closing the slice gates 
 The defection of eastern LTTE leader Col. Karuna Amman had made the 
LTTE weak in the region. 
Tigers in the face of advancing SLAF, decided to withdraw from the East to the 
jungles of Wanni and Mulative. Meanwhile the LTTE continued to carry-out attacks 
against civilian and government locations in the South unhindered. These included an 
attack on a SLAF Navy transit location in Habarana where sailors returning home on 
leave were targeted by an LTTE suicide bomber. The resulting death toll of 93 was 
considered the most deadly attack by LTTE suicide bombers on the Navy.222 More than 
15 suicide bombers attacked the SLAF Navy’s southern area command headquarters in 
Galle.223 
After the East was declared clear by the President, the government commenced 
immediate development projects. This was a shift from previous governments, which 
wanted the military to hold ground till until the entire threat was removed. The GoSL also 
initiated measures to establish civilian control in the East. The Eastern provincial 
elections were held for the first time in 20 years.224 
While sporadic fighting had been seen in the north, the government’s main focus 
had been on the East until the clearing of Thoppigalla. The Army suffered a shortage of 
troops to conduct offensives in both theaters (even with the unprecedented increase of 
troops) and handed over control of section of the liberated East to both Navy and Air 
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force, maintaining only a limited presence in the area. The Civil Defense Force also was 
employed to assist the military hold its ground in the East. 
Until late 2007, the Sri Lankan Army’s 57th division was conducting operations 
west of Omanthei. With the emphasis now shifting to the northern theater of war, plans 
were formulated to capture Silawathuai and Arippu in order to lessen the LTTE threat to 
the Mannar – Vavunia main road. Sri Lanka Army Special Forces groups were inducted 
into the area on 29 August 2007 and on 2 September, they captured Silawaturai, Arripu 
and Kondachchi with the support of the infantry. On 25 September 2007, troops from the 
57th Division captured the Forward Defense Line (FDL) at Periyathampanai, 
Villaththakulam and Mullikulam. Meanwhile Task Force One was advancing on the 
western flanks of the 57th Division. Madhu church, a symbolic location for Roman 
Catholics in the country was liberated on 24 April 2008.225 The troops from 58 Division 
captured Adappan, which opened access to Northeastern parts of Mannar on 9 May 2008. 
Meanwhile, the 59th Division was sent to conduct operations North of Welioya in 
January of 2008; they captured the “Munakkam base,” the LTTE’s main supply base in 
the area on 29 May 2008.226 Task Force Two, established to conduct operations east of 
A-9 road (main road connecting Jaffna to the rest of the country) began their advances 
from Mundimuruppu on 17 June 2008. On 30 June 2008 troops from the 58th Division 
advancing from Pallaimadu and the 57th Division from Periyamadu joined up and 
successfully cleared the Mannar area. On 16 July 2008, the 58th Division made a 
surprising deviation, moved in and gained control of Vedithalathivu, a sea tiger base 
which had evaded SLAF attacks for 21 years. The 59th Division advancing from the 
eastern front of the Wanni captured two main LTTE bases in Mulativu jungles by 24 July 
2008. The troops from the 53rd and 55th  Divisions which included the newly formed 
Mechanized Infantry overran LTTE first line defenses from Killali to Nagarkovil by 27 
July 2008.  
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The 57th Division moved toward the most important Tiger position, Killinochchi, 
the de facto capital of the LTTE administration. This battle forced the Army to shifted 
from the jungle to combat in an urbanized area. On 15 November 2008, Pooneryn was 
liberated and the Army managed to open up the A-32 Jaffna – Colombo land supply 
routes which had been closed for almost 20 years. The fight to capture the Tiger capital 
Killinochchi was fierce, however, the SLAF led by the 57th Division entered the LTTE 
capital from the South and the 58th Division arrived from the Northwest and together 
prevailed.227 
The main issue at this time for the Army moving from the jungle to urban areas 
was minimizing the impact on the innocent civilian population. The GoSL, understanding 
the importance of safeguarding the civilian population, for the first time in its military 
history, ordered the Army to establish a No Fire Zone (NFZ). The NFZ was east of 
Puthukkuduyirippu. The LTTE took this opportunity to move into the NFZ, one of their 
most effective tactics, and to escape the Armies long rang heavy weaponry and to launch 
attacks using their own artillery and other heavy weapons under the shield of the innocent 
civil population.228  
The LTTE, settled into the NFZ with heavy artillery and began to launch attacks 
on SLAF positions with the civilians as human shields. Understanding the damage that 
heavy weaponry could cause, especially targeted inside these NFZ, the military turned to 
its special operations forces for a solution. The operation was planned as a hostage rescue 
mission rather than a military offensive. The Commanders and SF troops supported by 
four infantry battalions moved closer to the NFZ, under heavy enemy fire.  They came 
approximately 300 meters from the LTTE earth barrier, created to shield the LTTE from 
the Army and to prevent the civilians from landscaping their hold. Without the use of 
heavy weapons the advancing Special Operation Forces (SOF) were completely without 
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supporting firepower. The first attempts to advance toward the earth barriers from both 
south and north resulted in casualties for the SOF troops. But on 19 April 2009, troops 
using the cover of darkness managed to reach the earth barriers with troops from the 
Special Forces Regiment arriving from the south, and the Commando Regiment coming 
from the north. With the two earth barriers under Army control, the civilians had a clear 
route to flee away from the fighting. It is estimated over 115,000 civilians were rescued 
from the NFZ.229 
With two divisions, the 53rd and 58th moving towards each other, the SLAF were 
able to liberate a great deal of land from LTTE control.  On 16 May 2009, troops 
advancing towards each other linked up along the coastline confining the LTTE into a 
1000 x 500m in Vellamullivaikkal. On 19 May 2009, the body of the dead LTTE leader 
was found and identified along with some of his top aids, bringing an end to the Eelam 
war.230 
B. DISTINGUISHABLE ADAPTATIONS THE SLAF MADE FROM PRE-
2006 TO POST-2006 
There are certain distinct changes that the SLAF went through during this time. 
These were organizational, strategic, operational and tactical.  
Organizationally one of the most important changes in the SLAF culture is the 
replacement of “first come, first promoted” policy for senior officers into performance 
based promotional policy. In regard to the selecting senior most officer to the leadership 
seats in all three services, the ruling government and President would previously consider 
the political affiliations of the senior officers before appointing them. This method was 
abandoned by the current government and replaced with performance-based 
appointments. Also from its inception, the seniority of the officers had been one of the 
major factors in making appointments.  If an officer “survived” rather than “performed” 
without any serious mistakes, he would be assured of a promotion to the highest ranking. 
The government valued obedience over innovative thinking. This immediately changed 




with the new government when it appointed VADM Wasantha Karranagodda as 
Commander of the Navy, who had seven considerably senior officers above him. He was 
also the first to be appointed directly from an area commander designation instead from a 
headquarters designation. The second example of the new government’s policy came 
when LtGen Sarath Fonseka was appointed as Commander of the Army. General 
Fonseka clearly had different political affiliations; the main reason the previous president 
had overlooked him for the post, despite his commendable battle field performance. He 
was two weeks away from compulsory retirement when the new president issued a 
presidential order to extend his service and appointed him to Command the Army during 
the final war. This new policy was not isolated to the top. In the Army usually “it is the 
No.5 officer in terms of seniority who is posted to the Jaffna Security Forces HQ. [But] 
In this case the person appointed was No.15 in seniority.” Also some junior officers put 
in charge of the divisions. “Brigadier Shaverndra Silva, for example, who spearheaded 
the capture of Pooneryn is [was] the 45th in terms of seniority.” As these examples 
showed, performance was now being rewarded in the SLAF.231 
The next organizational change came in procurement and training. In terms of 
logistics, instead of using private organizations as middlemen between government-to-
government sales, the ministry of defense established a subsidiary company “Lanka 
Logistics” to handle these transactions. The company also handled purchases from 
private organizations. Also because the organization was under the government and 
Ministry of Defense, the needs of the SLAF were more accurately translated rather than 
previously when the political authority bought what they thought the military “should 
have.” These miscommunications had caused many incompatible and unusable weapon 
systems such as the SLAF Navy’s hovercrafts, which were never used in combat.232 
Strategically the SLAF moved away from the annihilation-based strategy to an 
attrition-based strategy. The conventional military might of the SLAF has never been 
matched by the LTTE. During the major offensives from 1995–2001, large LTTE 
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controlled territories were recaptured by the SLAF. In response, the LTTE would 
withdraw from one theater to the other employ guerilla tactics against the SLAF.  The 
Army leadership at the time did not understand that their strategy to annihilate LTTE was 
not working. During the 2006 final war, the Army clearly understood they needed to shift 
their focus from retaking land to destroying the LTTE themselves. 
The military underwent operational changes too. During this time, the Army 
conducted the war on multiple lines of advance. When the shift was made from the East 
to the Wanni (North) theater, there were five infantry Divisions operating on different 
axes. With the resources the LTTE had, to conventionally hold these multiple advances 
was clearly impossible. For the first time in its history, the Sri Lankan military leadership 
and political leadership understood the need for engaging and informing the public and 
the international population of the war. At the same time, the Army understood the need 
to control the information flow. Their solution was the  establishment of the Media 
Centre for National Security and allowing the  media to have permanent TV crews 
embedded with the advancing army. On several important occasions, even International 
media was allowed to intermingle with these troops. This information flow was critically 
monitored and controlled allowing the Army to control what was said and how it was 
said in order to guide the perception of the public and the international community on the 
progress the Army was making.233  
Another key change with regard to military operations was the management of 
security in the capital and suburbs.  Terrorist attacks on key locations like the oil refinery 
and international airport were disruptive and negatively affected the economy. The 
attacks on civilian population were aimed at the psychology of the population who 
supported the government. In the past, these attacks had created massive responses of 
fear and intimidation, which eventually forced governments in power to halt or weaken 
their military offensives, implying that the LTTE had the upper hand. According to the 
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Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, prior to the resumption of the Eelam War IV, 
“we [the GoSL] were told that if we dared launch any military operation against the 
LTTE, Colombo will be blown to pieces.” He further explained the “more we pin the 
LTTE down in to the North and East, the more they will try to execute suicide attacks and 
such in other parts of the country in order to destabilize the populace.”234 
Stopping the infiltration of suicide bombers had always proved a problem for the SLAF. 
This was complicated by the fact that LTTE was believed to have sleeper suicide cells 
already deployed in these areas prior to the start of the Eelam War IV.235 
The action the military had to take in order to prevent this kind of terrorism was not 
popular, especially with the international human rights and other freedom groups. As 
Defense Secretary Rajapaksa explained, “To do all this [provide security in the areas], we 
have to implement controlling measures such as road blocks, searches, detention of 
suspects and questioning.”236  
One of the key problems the previous military commanders had faced was 
numbers. There simply were not enough troops to conduct all the necessary military 
operations. To address this, the political and military leadership adopted three distinct 
methodologies. 
 Major recruitment drives supplemented by media and professional 
promotional drives to uplift the status and the moral of the military person. 
 Using the local population of the war-threatened areas to protect 
themselves. The Civil Defense Force (CDF) was a key component of this 
and is discussed below. 
 Using a joint security mechanism to incorporate all three forces and police 
in to the operation thereby not depending only on the Army for all land 
operational duties.237 
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C. CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE 
One of the most crucial yet less widely acknowledged military components relied 
upon in the war in Sri Lanka, is the role played by the Home Guard. Also known as the 
Civil Defense Force (CDF), it is an auxiliary military component that is made up entirely 
of local villagers, making them part-time members of the military. The Home Guard was 
first established in Sri Lanka in 1985, under the Mobilization of Supplementary Force 
Act No. 40. Its main purpose was to assist the Sri Lanka Police in their duties and the 
command of the Home Guard was placed under the local police during the early stages of 
existence.238  
Originally, the Home Guard was merely comprised of a group of volunteers, who 
were each issued a shotgun. Their role was to protect the villages they lived in from the 
constant threat of the LTTE.  Villages that were in close proximity to the territory 
controlled by the LTTE or located close to the Army frontline were identified and 
classified as “threatened” or “border” villages. Due to the lack of specified boundaries, 
the LTTE constantly infiltrated these villages either to commit mass executions of 
Sinhalese or Muslims or to forcefully gather much needed resources including children, 
who were abducted and trained to become child soldiers.  Under the control of the police, 
this early Home Guard system was “not very well organized, not properly trained, the 
men were not motivated and they were not much respected [as a competent military 
element].”239  
The need for these auxiliary armed groups was critical, due to the limited human 
resources within the Sri Lanka Army that was available to provide protection to these 
villages. But because of their poor status of operational ability it was not a viable solution 
until the 2006 and the establishment of the newly reorganized CDF.240 
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In 2006, when the LTTE resumed attacks on the civilians of these threatened 
villages,  
The Secretary of Defence, Gotabaya Rajapaksa recommended to the 
President that the Home Guard Force be reorganized, restructured with 
better training and deployed for the protection of the threatened villages as 
an independent force under the Ministry of Defence.241  
This resulted in the creation of the Civil Defense Force (CDF) as a separate 
department under the Ministry of Defense. The command of this force was removed from 
the police and brought under a Director General (DG-CDF). The former Chief of Staff of 
the Sri Lanka Navy, RADM Sarath Weeraseraka, was appointed as the first Director 
General of the CDF, with instructions to re-organize, train and equip them to take up the 
“full responsibility of protecting the villages [so] the Army could be relived to engage in 
the primary task.”242 The first task implemented by the new DG-CDF was to conduct an 
analysis of the villages that were to be protected by the CDF, and initiate a recruitment 
program to increase the numbers. As in 2006 there were only 19,200 members. By 2009, 
the CDF’s increased to 41,500 personnel and was assisting the military in protecting the 
main supply routes and the Forward Defense Lines while fully undertaking the village 
protection duties.243  
Some of the main differences between the previous Home Guard system and the 
CDF were that CDF personnel were paid a stipend, and were issued military grade 
uniforms, which include combat camouflage, to improve their visible status. The CDF’s 
training included a compulsory one-month basic military training at CDF training centers 
under Sri Lanka Army and Sri Lanka Navy instructors. They were also provided advance 
training at SLAF Army and Navy bases. The SLAF Commando Regiment and Special 
Forces Regiment provided selected CDF personnel with Special Forces training for ten 
weeks and then grouped them in an elite group named "Nandimitra Balakaya." They were 
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also trained in tradecraft beyond their basic training, included night fighting, ambushes 
and unarmed combat. They were used as a deterrent; as means of holding off an enemy 
attack till the SLAF Army or Navy could reach these villages. Additionally, the CDF was 
issued Chinese-made Type-56 sub machine guns and MPMG that the Army was using in 
place of their old bore-12 shotguns. They were even issued advance equipment such as 
night vision optics and explosives.244 
Most significantly the CDF was incorporated into the larger military operations 
and security plans. By doing so, the SLAF effectively engaged the population in their 
own protection. As these CDF personnel were farmers and others ordinary members from 
the villages, they were directly affected by the ongoing insurgency and invested because 
they were there to “protect their villages, where their own kith and kin are, there is an 
additional reason for them to protect the village than an outsider [referring to the Army, 
Navy, Air Force or police personnel].” It was also their duty to report to the military 
commanders responsible for the security of the area about “lapses of the village security” 
and to engage with all the villagers including and head priest and/or the senior folk in the 
village.245 
As a whole the re-organized CDF was instrumental in deterring and repelling 
LTTE infiltrations and terrorist attacks on the border villages during the 2006 – 2009 
military operations, which saw the end of the LTTE. It was a critical component, as it 
was comprised of ordinary citizens from the villages that were in need of protection, 
giving the CDF a greater stake in how they choose to engage the LTTE. It also provided a 
means of securing quality intelligence from within these villages to the refocusing of the 
military upon offensive operations. 
                                                 
244 Amarasinghe and Kahandawaarachchi, “Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekara: Shielding the 
innocent,” 10–12. 
245 Amarasinghe and Kahandawaarachchi, “Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekara: Shielding the 
innocent,” 10–13. 
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D. SPECIAL INFANTRY OPERATION TEAMS AND ADVANCE 
INFANTRY OPERATION TRAINING 
Another change the Army made as a solution for increasing its numbers and 
improving the professionalism of its soldiers was the concept of Special Infantry 
Operation Teams (SIOT). The SIOT concept calls for creating small team inside infantry 
battalions, who were trained by SOF to conduct small team operations. These soldiers’ 
training emphasized small team operations and they were an asset to the infantry 
platoons. The concept called for the better training and equipment of the individual 
soldiers, something normal infantry training and operation do not emphasize. These 8-
man teams received specialized training in jungle warfare, explosives, and 
communications, which enabled these troops to conduct deep infiltration hit and run 
operations, call in and direct artillery and air strikes. These troops were embedded inside 
with regular troops (unlike SOF), which was an effort to defuse the training to the regular 
infantry and also to improve the standards of the infantry.246 
The SIOT also facilitated a very important aspect in COIN operations, which was 
to minimize collateral damage and filter local civilian populations for combatants.  
E. NAVAL ADAPTATIONS: THE EMBODIMENT OF COUNTER 
ADAPTATION WARFARE 
The military adaptations that the Sri Lankan military made during the conflict 
were visible in the Navy more than anywhere else. The LTTE was considered to be one 
of the very few insurgent groups to have operational sea capabilities.247 Dominance of 
the sea routes to south India, which provided the closest external sanctuary for them, and 
the ability to reinforce its operations by sea, proved to be crucial to the existence of the 
                                                 
246 The concept of SIOT was discussed in length during the “Defeating Terrorism - Sri Lankan 
Experience Symposium,” May 31, 2011. Also supplemented by the personal communications of the author 
with Sri Lanka Army officers involved in planning and implementing the concept. 
247 Arabinda Acharya & Nadeeka P. Withana, “Groups with Maritime Terrorist Capabilities in the 
Indian Ocean Region” in V.R. Raghavan & W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar (eds.), Maritime security in the 
Indian Ocean region: Critical Issues in Debate (New Delhi: Tata McGraw- Hill, 2008), 204–207; Peter 
Lehr, “Asymmetric Warfare in the Indian Ocean: What Kind of Threat from What Kind of Actor,” ibid., 
173, 178–179; . Also see, Rohan Gunaratna, “The Asymmetric Threat from Maritime Terrorism,” Jane’s 
Navy International, Oct 1, 2001. 
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LTTE.  The Sea Tigers, LTTE’s naval wing, were formed in the early 1980s and were 
highly effective, especially in their use of the Black Sea Tiger element, which was the 
water born unit of the Black Tigers, their elite, highly trained, and motivated suicide 
force.  
The supreme leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran formed the Naval wing 
of the LTTE or the Sea Tigers’ under the leadership of Thillaiyampalam Sivanesan, aka 
“Colonel Soosai,” who was a tactical and strategic mastermind. The Sea Tigers unit was 
created in the early 1980s and started off using small boats and ferries to transport 
supplies and troops across the waters separating the north of Sri Lanka from Tamil 
Nadu.248 The LTTE also owned its own international shipping network, which provided 
the equipment and supplies needed by the Tamil Tigers.  
The initial attempts of the Sri Lankan Navy (SLN) to hinder these operations 
using its fleet of Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) were somewhat successful.  The Tigers 
began using faster craft with more powerful engines, allowing the Sea Tiger cadres to 
outrun the slower SLN patrols. The Sea Tigers locally manufactured their own fiberglass 
fast-attack craft and equipped them with four 250 horsepower outboard engines on the 
larger crafts, and with two engines on the smaller boats. These boats were mainly the 
45 knots “Thrikka” with four crews and a machine gun; the 10 knots “Sudai” with a 
single machine gun; the 45 knots “Muraj” or “Waverider” with a crew of 10; and the 
“Idayan,” a 45 knots suicide craft. The Muraj was used mainly as command vessels and 
is comparable in most ways to the SLN’s own IPC (Inshore Patrol Craft). 
The Sea Tigers lacked their own harbors or secure launching sites.  They adapted 
by engineering a method of launching their boats using tractors and trailers. This method 




                                                 
248 While there is a vast collection conflicting of literature on India and Tamil Nadu’s involvement 
with the LTTE it is common knowledge of the region that the Tigers enjoyed the support of the population 
and politicians of Tamil Nadu. 
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hide the craft inshore, sometimes more than ten kilometers away from the beach, and 
would only launch when necessary. This gave the LTTE mobility, flexibility, and the 
element of surprise.249 
The Sea Tigers’ most successful innovation was their use of “wolf pack” swarm 
attacks.250 Once they identified a target, five or more small boats of the Sea Tigers would 
approach the target craft, engage it from all directions, and disrupt its ability to flee the 
area.  While these small boats attacked and engaged the target, a suicide craft would 
move against the target boat using the cover of the larger command vessels of the sea 
tigers. These suicide boats were usually small fiberglass boats manned by a single Black 
Tiger. The hull of the boat was packed with high explosives and rigged to a pressure 
trigger located at the front of the boat. This allowed the boat to trigger the IED by 
ramming in to the target vessel.251   
The Sri Lanka Navy has its roots as a ceremonial force left behind by the British 
Empire, and was predominantly used as a logistic support element to the Sri Lanka Army.  
In the 1990s, the SLN only had large ships, mostly leftover by the Royal Navy or gifted 
by friendly nations. While these were well-suited for blue-water patrolling operations to 
safe guard against unauthorized fishing or smuggling, they definitely were no match for 
the heavily armed small boat coastal operations of the Sea Tigers.  
By the early 1990s, the Navy understood that it needed to adapt, and become a 
more aggressive fighting force to counter the mounting threat of the Sea Tigers and to 
dominate the lagoon/mangrove areas of Jaffna peninsula and eastern areas.  In response 
to these threats, in 1993, the Sri Lanka Armed Force’s (SLAF) formed the Special Boat 
Squadron (SBS)—modeled after the U.K. Navy’s elite Special Boat Service and the 
United States Navy’s elite SEALs—under the command of then LCDR Ravindra 
Chandrasiri Wijegunarathne (presently RADM and the Northern Area Naval 
                                                 
249 Author as a member of the Sri Lanka Navy’s SBS has been trained and informed of the history, 
formations and capabilities of the LTTE and the SBS. Also his experience, the experience of his colleagues 
of SBS is included here. 
250 The Sea Tigers also developed new tactics and operations using suicide boats, suicide submersible 
attacks, floating sea mines, and suicide divers.   
251 Author’s training, and personal experience. 
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Commander).  The first operation carried out by the SBS was in November 1993, where 
it played an integral part in the recapturing of the Navy camp in Pooneryn, which had 
been attacked and overrun by terrorists.252  
In its search for a technology to counter the Sea Tigers, the SLN found that “the 
Israeli navy was facing a similar threat and were using Dvora fast attack craft as a 
response.”253 These Dvora fast attack craft provided a guard against the LTTE's logistic 
boats, which they used mainly to transport supplies from their ships operating in 
international waters and to smuggle supplies, and personnel in and out of south India. The 
4th Fast Attack Flotilla of the Navy, a.k.a. the Dvora Squadron, was in the forefront of the 
fight against the Sea Tigers, protecting both naval and civilian transport vessels.  
After the LTTE developed its “wolf pack” attacks, the Dvoras were vulnerable 
because of their limited maneuverability and close contact capabilities.  The Sea Tigers 
managed to engage these Dvoras successfully, sinking more than twenty Sri Lanka 
Navy’s Dvora-class, Fast Attack Boats.254 The Sea Tigers continued their successful 
strategy against ships larger than Dvoras, sinking larger transport ships and gunboats at 
will. They also attacked many civilian supply ships baring supplies to the North and East. 
The realization that the heavier Dvoras were no match for small, fast-moving and 
lightly crewed boats of the Sea Tigers in shallower seas came at a high cost. While the 
SBS experimented with light smaller craft including Combat Rubber Reconnaissance 
Craft (CRRCs) they were too small and slow and were highly ineffective against the Sea 
Tigers. At this point, the Sri Lanka Navy was at a dead end – they were out matched by 
the naval capabilities of the Sea Tigers.255 
                                                 
252 See footnote 249. 
253 Comments presented at interviews by ADM Wasantha Karrannagoda, former commander of the 
Sri Lanka Navy. 
254 The numbers are based on a defense ministry publication 
(http://www.defence.lk/news/20110801_Conf.pdf) and shows only naval vessels completely destroyed by 
attacks. Some underwater suicide divers are known to have used submersibles vehicles. Most Black tigers 
that took part in naval battles were carders who were casualties from land warfare. 
255 See footnote 249. 
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This changed in 2006, when a Sri Lanka Navy SBS operation, led by then LCDR 
Dissanayake Mudiyanselage Bandula Dissanayake discovered the LTTE’s hideout at 
which they were manufacturing the small 16-foot boats they used for their wolf pack 
attacks.  It was at this location that the SBS found a boat buried in the ground, which was 
later recovered and brought to the Naval dockyard at Trincomalee. The Naval engineers 
reverse engineered a version of this boat, which was the first 16 foot Arrow Boat of the 
SLN. The small boat was fitted with a 12.7mm main gun, and a stern gun that was an 
Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL). Two 115 horsepower outboard engines propelled it 
to speeds in excess of 25 knots. In addition, the boat was highly maneuverable. With the 
guidance and encouragement of then Commander of the SLN, VADM Wasantha 
Karannagoda, Navy engineers experimented with different configurations of the same 
base model.256 
 The result was two more versions of the Arrow Boat, the 18 footer and the highly 
successful version, the 23 foot Arrow Boat, which went into mass production.   The  
23-footer was manned by four person crew: a coxswain, main gunner, stern gunner and a 
side gunner. The boat was capable of being fitted with either a 12.7mm, 23mm, or 30mm 
main gun (some even were equipped with twin cannon versions); a 12.7mm or AGL stern 
gun; and two 7.62mm Chinese Multi-Purpose Machine Gun (MPMG) as side guns. 
Powered by two 250 horsepower engines, the boat boasted speeds of up to 35 knots.257  
During the period from 2007 to 2009, 200 of these boats were produced and put 
into action by the Navy’s dockyard in Welisara.258 These boats, though small, were 
capable of operating in rough seas up to Sea State-4.259 The boats’ draft was significantly  
 
 
                                                 
256 See footnote 249. 
257 See footnote 249. 
258 By the end of 2009, the Navy’s Dockyard in Walisara had completed 200 Arrow Boats. The 
Defense Secretary of Sri Lanka on 09/11/2008 put the 100th boat underway ceremonially. 
http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2008/09/14/sec02.asp. 
259 Sea state is the general condition of the free surface on sea, with respect to wind, waves and swell 
at a certain location and moment. 
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lower, allowing mobility in extremely shallow waters. The boats’ cross section was 
smaller in comparison to other craft, presenting a smaller target at sea, and making 
targeting from land almost impossible. 
With the combination of high firepower and high maneuverability, these Arrow 
Boats had the ability to engage the smaller Sea Tiger boats on their own terms, by going 
close and fighting one on one.260 The most credible evidence on the success of these 
small Arrow Boats were the acknowledgements given by the Sea Tigers themselves 
mentioning the hardships of countering the new fleet of small boats of the SLN.261 
While the Arrow Boats provided the much-needed platform to counter the Sea 
Tigers, the Navy’s training, operational and tactical doctrines also underwent drastic 
changes. The Navy introduced the operational concept of four layers of “defense 
barriers.” This concept made use of the Navy’s flagship and larger offshore vessels in the 
outer layer, followed by the Gun Boats, the Dvoras, and  Arrow Boats who were the first 
line of defense in coastal waters. This layered system offered protection and offensive 
capability against the movements of the Sea Tigers. This methodology helped the 
prevention of the Sea Tigers supplying troops and equipment from ships in the 
international waters or from south India to the island. It further prevented the LTTE 
leadership from escaping the country by sea during the latter stages of the conflict.262 
Tactically, the SBS developed a specific formation for using these Arrow Boats.  
The formation was led by one command boat that was either a Waverider263 or IPC264 
equipped with Electro-Optical Devices (EOD) and radar capabilities. This command boat 
served as the eyes and ears of the smaller boats in patrol against the Sea Tiger 
movements. Since the smaller boats did not have radar capability and had only limited 
                                                 
260 These boats carried no armor to provide defense. The weight and other constraints of having 
amour proved to be less effective in the battle space.   
261 Authors and his colleagues interactions with captured and surrendered LTTE carders. 
262 See footnote 249. 
263 Waverider is a larger Inshore Patrol Craft designed and manufactured by the Navy Dockyard. This 
was modeled after the “Indumathi” craft captured from the LTTE. 
264 Inshore Patrol Craft or IPC are a craft smaller than the Dvora’s manned by close to 12 which has 
the ability to carry RADAR and EOD systems. 
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visibility, specifically at nighttime when the boats had to rely on personal night vision 
goggles, the command boats role was vital in detecting and engaging the Sea Tigers.  
When encountering an enemy craft, some of the Arrow Boats would break off to engage 
the Sea Tigers depending of the craft they encountered. For larger craft that were 
operating individually, the Arrow Boats used the same swarming tactics of the Sea 
Tigers.  For smaller enemy craft, the Arrow Boats would engage in close quarter fighting, 
sometimes closing within 20 meters of the enemy boats, in what could be compared to 
dogfights between fighter jets. The possibility that the Sea Tiger boats formations had 
suicide boats in their ranks made every attempt of close contact a deadly ordeal.265 
A comprehensive study of the attack patterns of the Sea Tigers from 2006 to 2009 
clearly indicates the success of the SLN’s operations. In 2006, Sea Tigers engaged the 
Navy offensively more than 21 times. In 2007, the number of confrontations was twelve. 
In 2008, there were less than five confrontations, and finally by 2009, the Sea Tigers 
were defeated.266  
While this irregular aspect was considered a key element in the victory of the war, 
and especially the sea born aspects of it. But Navy also contributed early on for the total 
success of the SLAF and the demise of the LTTE. The Navy as mentioned before was 
more of a brown water Navy. Its blue-water capability was if at all, was minimal. The 
LTTE exploited this failure of the Navy to patrol its own extended zone by operating its 
own fleet of transport shipping. These ships were key in LTTE’s survival because they 
were supplying the much-needed military supplies to the LTTE. 
The conventional maritime interdiction of the LTTE floating warehouses was a 
key measure in cutting the supply routes of the LTTE. The action of the Navy have been 
well documented by LCDR AAC Karunasena of the Sri Lanka Navy in his paper entitled 
“The Role of the Sri Lanka Navy in the Counterinsurgency Operation”267 and in the 
                                                 
265 See footnote 249. 
266 The Sri Lankan Navy and Ministry of Defence has conducted studies of the attack patterns and 
capabilities of the LTTE. 
267 AAC Karunasena, “The Role of the Sri Lanka Navy in the Counterinsurgency Operation”(Final 
Research Paper, Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, 2011). 
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Master’s thesis of Justin O. Smith entitled “Maritime Interdiction in Counterinsurgency: 
The role of the Sri Lankan Navy in the defeat of the Tamil Tigers,” written while 
attending the Naval Postgraduate School.268 This writing does not wish to reiterate what 
has already being said of the importance of this blue water naval activity. 
F. SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONS CAPABILITY 
The force multiplier of the Sri Lanka military, the Special Operation Forces 
contributed to its learning and adapting immensely. The adherent culture of innovative 
thinking and risk-taking, the small unit operations abilities provided a ground for quick 
adaptations to the situation. 
These include the SLAF Army Commando (CDO) Regiment, Special Force (SF) 
Regiment and the Sri Lanka Navy Special Boat Squadron (SBS). Collectively these units 
learned and perfected some of the most effective tactical capabilities, which helped the 
military meet the insurgent guerrilla techniques with their own guerilla or “anti-guerrilla” 
techniques. 
One of the key capabilities developed and perfected was the ability to conduct 
deep infiltration operations into enemy held territory. The history of the Long Range 
Reconnaissance Patrol troops (LRRP) goes back to 1996 when then Major D.R. Wijesiri, 
Commanding Officer of the 2nd SF regiment, requested for volunteers to conduct 
operations deep inside enemy held area. The volunteers were then selected based on 
physical and mental evaluation and the first team of 20 other ranks (enlisted) was 
established in Pranthan, where the 2nd SF regiments was based (26 October 1996).269 
A team led by British SAS First Sergeant of Travel who conducted small team 
operations training for officers and others from SF and Commando Regiment trained 
these teams. Later U.S. Army Rangers conducted a Balance—Style course for a two 
teams of 12 each. Later an LRRP training course was locally initiated using instructors 
                                                 
268 Justin O. Smith, “Maritime Interdiction in Counterinsurgency: The role of the Sri Lankan Navy in 
the defeat of the Tamil Tigers” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
269 Author’s personal communication with Col. Jayantha Rathnayake, one of the founding officers of 
the 2nd SF and former Commanding Officer of the 2nd SF regiment of the Sri Lanka Army. 
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from the initial teams by both the Commando training school and the Special Forces 
training school. The Sri Lanka Navy SBS troops were later invited to undergo these 
training and a team of LRRP was established in the Navy.270 
The primary task of the LRRP was twofold, first, the elimination of high valued 
targets and second the real-time information gathering inside enemy territory.  These 
troops also were trained to call in precise air raids on identified enemy locations. The 
success of the troops have been acknowledged not just by the military but also by the 
enemy, who considered the LRRP operations to be a number one concern, prompting 
LTTE leadership to introduce armored vehicles for its senior leaders of the LTTE. These 
operations successfully restricted the freedom of movement the LTTE leaders had inside 
their own territory. By doing so, they managed to further divide the population of the 
areas and the LTTE.271 
The most successful guided air attack on the LTTE was the targeting of their 
Political wing leader SP Tamilchelvam. Brigadier Tamilchelvam was one of the key 
strategic planners and leaders of the LTTE, who, after suffering casualties, was appointed 
as the head of the Political wing. But, in 2008, aided by the LRRP this highly valued 
target was eliminated using precision bombs that was dropped by the SLAF Air Force 
inside LTTE held territory. The information and real time guidance provided by the 
troops on ground deep inside the enemy territory effectively assisted in the AF ability to 
target only the enemy bunker and avoid collateral damage. While this was the most 
successful operation because of the nature of the target, there were several other targets 
that the Air Force eliminated with the information and guidance provided by the LRRP 
troops. 
Also these deep infiltration troops conducted high value targeting inside enemy 
territory by themselves. A notable operation was the elimination of Seelan, and Soosai, 
two main LTTE commanders. The ability to provide accurate information from within 
the enemy territory to the troop commanders advancing was also a key aspect allowing 
                                                 
270 See footnote 268; The author was also has operated as part of the SBS LRRP group. 
271 Ibid. 
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the commanders to create plans to hunt the LTTE while safeguarding the non combatant 
population inside these areas. 
G. LESSEN COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO SAFEGUARD THE CIVILIANS 
One example of using SOF in place of heavy weapons and amour was the 
operations undertaken by the Commando’s and SF of the 59th Division to capture the 
earth berms in Nandikadal No – Fire zones. The earth berms constructed by LTTE to halt 
the advance of the army, and to prevent the civilians they were holding as human shields 
from escaping was a key constraint for the military during the last phase of the operation. 
The civilian population was preventing the military from using aerial bombing or heavy 
artillery or rockets.272  
The risk of using SOF at this terrain that provided no cover for the troops trying to 
advance on the earth boundaries meant that other than, in the cover of darkness in the 
night, the troops were “pickings at will” for the LTTE marksmen.  Understanding the 
need to conduct this operation with minimal damage to and maximum recovery of the 
civilians, the Army resorted to the most risky and costly method available, SOF. Using 
the darkness as the only cover and suffering major casualties at the hands of the LTTE, 
the SOF managed to reach, overcome and secure the earth boundaries allowing a passage 
for the trapped civilian population to move from LTTE area to the security forces area. 
Also by attacking the land strip from the south and north simultaneously, the military 
effectively divided the remaining LTTE carders and finally managed to eliminate the 
LTTE completely.273 
The Special Operation Forces capability clearly showcased the transformation the 
military was making to counter the LTTE. During the 2006–2009 time frame these 
operation took center stage as operations supported by conventional infantry rather than 
                                                 
272 Based on a Presentation on the topic of “Counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka” made to the Pakistan 
Military Academy by Lt.Col. Lakshan De Silva of the Sri Lanka Army while attending the Pakistan 
Military Staff College program. The said officer was attending Naval Postgraduate School during the time 
of this writing, allowing first hand experience sharing with the author. Also supplemented by author’s own 
experience as a officer in the Sri Lanka Navy during this period and his personal communications with 
Officer and other ranks of the Sri Lanka Army, who served during this time period. 
273 Ibid. 
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being operations to support the infantry. This was a key change in the attitude of the 
Military commanders planning operations signifying the acceptance of unconventional 
war tactics. 
In concluding, this chapter should show the Sri Lanka military underwent a 
gradual change from a ceremonial force to a capable counterinsurgency force. The main 
reasons for this included the ability to learn from the mistakes of the past and to adapt to 
make the necessary changes. This was possible because of the changes that took place 
from the very top of the chain of command leading from the Commander-in-Chief to the 
bottom. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
A. ANALYSIS 
The preceding analysis discusses how political will power and the stability of the 
GoSL, changing international influences, and military strategy contributed to the demise 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam. It further highlights that the variables that 
contributed to the demise of the LTTE were a combination of unique and reproducible 
ones. This chapter intends to summarize the key findings of the study.  
The ethnic conflict of Sri Lanka existed since Sri Lanka’s independence. The real 
political power struggles, particularly in the post-1948 era, gave way to a further divide in 
the population between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil. Fueled by 
perceptions of discriminations that resulted in violent actions and reprisals, the conflict 
between the GoSL and the LTTE began and ravaged the land for a period of nearly three 
decades. It destroyed the country in every sphere and caused a polarization of the ethnic 
groups, leaving behind a legacy of damage that tarnished the country and the people for 
years to come. 
After the violations of a 2002 Cease Fire Agreement, the Sinhala majority 
demanded a “war for peace.” The government, with a solid majority power of nearly two 
thirds in Parliament, successfully created a strong wave of Sri Lankan nationalism 
through an effective marketing campaign.  The Rajapaksa administration guided the 
people to seek to liberate their land and the innocent Tamil people in the North and the 
East. All these factors together significantly changed the political climate in the country, 
providing a solid support of the COIN programs of the military.  
Yet, while internal political dynamics are significant in understanding the rise and 
fall of the LTTE, the external political, social, and economical changes in the region 
affected the conflict and the COIN actions that were adapted. Since Sri Lanka’s 
independence, India influenced not only the conflict in Sri Lanka but also each and every 
key sector. The country never sat passively, but has actively intervened in the internal 
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politics of Sri Lanka and also has intervened in the military affairs of the state. As a 
major regional power and the “big brother” of the region, this comes as no surprise. India 
and its southern state, Tamil Nadu, fed the primary and secondary waves of Tamil 
nationalism. Because the concept of a Tamil Homeland threatened the stability of the 
central government in India, India preferred the destabilization of Sri Lanka and its 
politics. Thus, it was India, who supported, trained, organized, and controlled the initial 
Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka, in hopes that by gaining control they would prevent the 
formation of a new federal state in its own territory. 
Ultimately, the LTTE managed to break free of this control by India. The Indian 
military intervention was costly and was referred to as “India’s Vietnam.” The creation of  
proper channels of communication between India and Sri Lanka and the assassination of 
Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi catalyzed Indian withdrawal from the island and left Sri 
Lanka to continue their military strategies without any Indian intervention and, on 
occasion, with Indian support.   
This study also discussed how the Tamil Diaspora played a critical role as an 
international actor with regard to the conflict in Sri Lanka, and how the group actively 
extended support during the last decades of the war. The Tamil Diaspora, willingly and 
unwillingly, supported the LTTE and sustained its terrorist agendas over decades. 
Presently, in the absence of the LTTE, the Diaspora continues providing underground 
movements with support via their political campaigns against Sri Lanka (and its 
government) which they accomplish through putting pressure on the Western countries 
that they are living in. They have now gone on to form various other guises to their cause 
as they lobby throughout the international arena. It is speculated that they have acquired 
the support of many media institutions and politicians; this support is said to have been 
acquired through their wealth and their voting majority in the countries they now inhabit. 
The attacks on the US on September 11th was a critical turning point in this flow of funds 
and other support, and marked the downfall of the LTTE as a terrorist organization in the 
international arena. This is yet another example of how the global situations and actions 
taken by other sovereign states directly affected the future of the Sri Lankan conflict. 
However, with a majority of the developed states recognizing LTTE as a terrorist 
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organization, it’s financial and communication agenda was limited, leaving the LTTE 
vulnerable.  Sri Lanka, from this political policy shift, managed to successfully obtain the 
support of India and other countries, such as the USA and the UK, against the LTTE and 
thereby limit the dissent and the further spread of the LTTE. The internal stability and 
loss of its ability to manipulate real politics in the international system were the two main 
variables of the COIN strategy that brought the end to the LTTE in 2009. 
The LTTE’s selected method of operation, a combination of guerrilla tactics and 
terrorist attacks, proved effective in the initial stages of the conflict because of the 
failures of the conventional-minded, ceremonial force of the Sri Lankan military. But 
with time the military managed to become a fast adapting organization capable of 
matching up to and finally finishing off the LTTE.  
The clear change of strategy of the military was key in resolving the conflict. The 
military moved away from its annihilation strategy to attrition-based strategy that proved 
effective in diminishing the enemy’s capability. Operationally, the military moved away 
from massive infantry advances to small group capabilities, which were more similar to 
the LTTE’s operations. For example, one of the military’s main shifts was to take into 
consideration the non-combatant population of the area. By interacting with them, the 
military managed to differentiate the population from the insurgents. It also successfully 
adopted the civil defense concept and engaged the civilian population against the enemy 
(the LTTE). By doing so the government managed to establish the CDF which took over 
the role of protection of the innocent non-combatant population in the threatened villages. 
With the CDF protecting the population and also assisting in the defensive role, the 
military was made available to continue with the offensive action. The LTTE’s ability to 
hide among the population and be a true insurgent organization was thus limited. This 
was further damaging because the LTTE leadership also was adopting more conventional 
methods of attacks against the SLAF. The capabilities of the conventional SLAF was 
clearly unmatched by the LTTE. Another key change was the multiple lines of 
operations, which effectively eliminated the breathing space the LTTE had in previous 
military offensives.  
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Tactically, the SLAF special operation forces were game changers. They managed 
to match the insurgent guerilla tactics with their own counter-guerilla tactics. By 
targeting the insurgent commanders inside their own territory, the SOF managed to instill 
fear in the minds of the LTTE command and thereby the SOF limited the LTTE’s 
freedom of movement.  
Aided by its hierarchical structure and by gaining the control of the autonomous 
regions awarded to it by the CFA of 2002, the LTTE shifted their military organization 
and operations towards conventional basing.  The ability of the Sri Lankan government to 
prevent terror attacks (by securing the capital and other key locations) was also key in 
sustaining the needed support for the military action. 
The changes that the political and military establishments underwent from 2006 to 
2009 emerged as the main theme of this study. This can be attributed to the fact that 
higher authorities were willing to study and learn from their past mistakes and to allow 
rapid change in the otherwise slow changing bureaucratic organizations of the 
government and military. 
While external changes were critical, it should be noted that the government took 
advantage of the changes in the external environment. To do so the government and the 
military had be adaptable. In looking at the Sri Lankan conflict, it can be seen that the 
political will and stability needed to engage the population was only achieved in 2006, 
after the current president came to power. With reference to Mao’s insurgent fish in the 
water of people, the relevant population was, from the start, divided. The insurgents only 
had a small segment of the population from which they could draw support: the Tami 
population in the North and East. In terms of drawing political support, the LTTE utilized 
the grievances of the Tamil population against the GOSL as propaganda against their 
opposition. But the current government’s tactic to engage the population positively and 
the LTTE’s own attempt to govern the population, after gaining the autonomous region in 
an oppressive way, broke the LTTE’s connections with the Tamil population. Moreover, 
the LTTE, with the continuous loss of land to the Sri Lankan military, rapidly began to 
lose control of the political space.  
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The breakdown of external support, from both the shift in the international 
attitude against terrorists and the active disruption by Sri Lanka Navy, severely affected 
the LTTE. The dependence of the LTTE on this external support was near total. Finally, 
while the availability of voluntary sanctuary was still used in Tami Nadu, the actions of 
the Sri Lanka Navy made access impossible.  
Most of what is discussed in this thesis is country and situation specific; however, 
the central theme of the success of the GoSL and SLAF is adaptation by learning. This is 
not unique and will serve any nation, government, or military that is looking to find a 
solution to a similar irregular threat.  
For a majority of the states that are going through intra-state conflicts of similar 
forms, this provides a great lesson: mass mobilization of public and political support 
internally and externally can indeed fight any form of terrorism, but only if the states are 
willing to learn and adapt according to the changes in the conflict. To do so, states have 
to establish strong political stability and focus in order to continue in a selected strategy 
that will pave the way for success and catalyze an end to brutal armed conflict similar to 
the one between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. 
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